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ABSTRACT 
This thesis assesses the effect of the United States’ relationship with Israel on 
U.S. foreign policy objectives in the Middle East.  I conduct an analysis of U.S. interests 
and relations in the Middle East, separate from considerations of domestic politics, to 
determine whether U.S. foreign policies in fact further national interests. I analyze three 
U.S. national interests in the Middle East: (1) nonproliferation of WMD, (2) spreading 
democracy, and (3) combating terrorism respective to Iran, Syria, and Egypt to conclude 
whether the national interest is positively, negatively, or negligibly affected by the U.S.–
Israeli relationship. While the thesis highlights possible interests and areas where U.S. 
national interests are not well-served by the U.S.–Israeli relationship, the thesis does not 
conclude that the U.S. should withdraw support of Israel. It is in U.S. interests to support 
the existence of its allies. However, the thesis does conclude that greater objective debate 
should take place to assess the U.S.–Israeli relationship with respect to other U.S. 
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A. THESIS AND MAJOR ARGUMENTS 
The Middle East contains a significant amount of the world’s oil, is plagued with 
violence and instability, and breeds terrorism and anti-Americanism. It also contains 
regimes hostile to the U.S., with active Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programs. 
In early 2006, Professors John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt published a controversial 
working paper claiming the “Israeli Lobby” has excessive influence on United States 
foreign policy, which may be detrimental to our interests.1 The United States’ 
relationship with Israel is widely perceived to be overly supportive and uncritical to the 
extent that the United States is not viewed as diplomatically even-handed in the Middle 
East. References to the United States–Israeli relationship refer to this perception and the 
thesis seeks to conduct an objective analysis of how that perception affects our national 
interests in the Middle East. To advance the cause of national security, I conduct an 
analysis of U.S. interests and relations in the Middle East, separate from considerations of 
domestic politics, to determine whether U.S. foreign policies in fact further national 
interests. The purpose of this thesis is to assess the effect of the United States’ 
relationship with Israel on U.S. foreign policy objectives in the Middle East.  To do so, I 
analyze three U.S. national interests in the Middle East: (1) nonproliferation of WMD, (2) 
spreading democracy, and (3) combating terrorism. Conclusions from this thesis call for 
greater debate on whether U.S. national policies in the Middle East achieve U.S. 
objectives that best facilitate U.S. security.  
This thesis strives to address how U.S. support of Israel affects other U.S. national 
interests in the Middle East. Answering this question entails ascertaining U.S. national 
interests in the Middle East and the precise nature of the relationship with Israel. After 
assessing U.S. national interests in the Middle East and the U.S. relationship with Israel, 
the thesis investigates three interests that could be affected by the Israeli relationship 
                                                 
1  John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, KSG Faculty 
Research Working Paper RWP, 06-011 (Harvard University, March 2006).  
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(nonproliferation of WMD, spreading democracy, and combating terrorism) by assessing 
each national interest in relation to three states in the region: Iran, Syria, and Egypt.  
I conclude that the U.S. relationship with Israel may negatively impact the U.S. 
national interests of preventing proliferation of WMD in the Middle East and combating 
international terrorism, while having a somewhat negligible impact on the U.S. national 
interest of democracy promotion.  While an overall conclusion on the impact of the U.S.–
Israeli relationship on U.S. national security is outside the scope of this thesis, the thesis 
does assess the relationship in a manner that should be further studied, outside the scope 
of domestic politics, and within the purview that seeks the greatest security for the United 
States.   
B. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST 
To discuss U.S. foreign policy and national interests, it is necessary to define the 
terms. Foreign policy can be described as “the policy of a nation that encompasses all 
official relations with other countries…for the United States, the purpose is to pursue 
national interests, prevent conditions detrimental to the United States, and maintain 
relations with other countries in order to create conditions favorable to our national 
interests.”2 The concept of national interest is more troubling since, as William Quandt 
explains, any definition of the national interest must contain strong subjective elements. 
Objective yardsticks may not exist to determine interests, and several interests may 
compete (the Arab-Israeli conflict is an example) to compound policy making problems.3 
As Hastedt points out, the concept of national interest may be employed to describe goals 
and values sought in a foreign policy, or normatively to add emphasis on values and goals 
not being pursued by policymakers.  He surmises that “the U.S. national interest is 
whatever U.S. policy makers are willing to make sacrifices to achieve.”4 A more helpful 
                                                 
2  Sam Charles Sarkesian, John Allen Williams and Stephen J. Cimbala, U.S. National Security: 
Policymakers, Processes, and Politics, 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 13. 
3 William Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press), 11. 
4  Glenn P. Hastedt, American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future, 5th ed. (Upper Saddle River, 
N.J: Prentice Hall, 2003), 24. 
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way to think of national interests is to first delineate vital interests such as protecting the 
homeland and related issues. Second would be critical interests, areas, and issues not 
posing a threat to the homeland, but with the propensity in the long run to become a first-
order priority. Third would be serious interests that do not affect vital or critical interests 
“...yet cast some shadow over such interests. [Indeed,] U.S. efforts are focused on 
creating favorable conditions to preclude Third Order events from developing into 
higher-order ones... [and finally] all other interests are peripheral.”5 During the Cold 
War, identifying the national interest was simple: containing the communist Soviet 
Union. Today, it is more difficult. It appears that more normative terms are being used to 
describe the national interest, such as promoting peace, prosperity, and freedom. 
Regardless, this thesis uses the term national interest to describe tasks, goals, objectives, 
values, or interests that further the security and prosperity of the United States, with the 
assumption that benefits to others as a result of our pursuit of national interests are, as 
Condoleezza Rice describes them, “second order.”6   
C. U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
Since the United States became concerned with the Middle East after World War 
II, the U.S. interests in the region have been somewhat stable. As Stansfield Turner 
noted, “from the 1940s to 2001, the United States has pursued the twin objectives in the 
Middle East of political stability to ensure the flow of oil and political survival of 
Israel.”7 An additional interest of even greater importance in the Middle East was to 
contain Soviet influence during the Cold War. This global interest was often the 
overriding interest of U.S. foreign policy in the world, and regional interests were 
secondary. Ibrahim argued that another U.S. national interest in the Middle East was to 
oppose radical nationalism, such as Nasser in Egypt, and to promote further Arab 
                                                 
5  Sarkesian, Williams and Cimbala, U.S. National Security: Policymakers, Processes, and Politics, 
331. 
6  Condoleezza Rice, "Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest," Foreign Affairs 
(January/February 2000). 
7  Stansfield Turner, "The Critical Nature of U.S. Policy in the Middle East," Mediterranean Quarterly 
14, no. 4  (2003), 47. 
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disunity.8 Tillman argued that a U.S. national interest in the Middle East was to align 
U.S. principles of peaceful settlement of disputes and the right of self-determination to 
the Arab-Israeli conflict.9 The United States sought stability, access to oil, containment of 
Soviet influence, to deter Arab nationalism, peaceful settlement of disputes, and to 
promote the right to self determination. As in most regions, the U.S. also sought access to 
markets for U.S. commercial interests in the Middle East. Recalling the overriding 
objective of containing Soviet influence, a natural question to be asked at this time is: 
With the end of the Cold War and the subsequent interest of containing Soviet influence 
in the Middle East no longer required, how does continued support of Israel affect U.S. 
interests in the Middle East? Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S.–Israeli relationship 
has continued.  
It is now appropriate to begin the discussion of U.S. national interests in the 
Middle East anew. I begin with the statements of Condoleezza Rice during the campaign 
period before the Bush Administration entered office, then extract national interests 
derived from the current National Security Strategy, and conclude with some inputs and 
criticisms from scholars and former U.S. government officials. Rice, in 2000, defined the 
national interest as spreading peace, freedom and prosperity — with peace as the 
precondition.  She asserted that the Middle East is a region of “core interest,” 
acknowledged the U.S. as the sole guarantor of stability and peace in the world, and 
stated that the U.S. under Republican leadership would be internationalist; it would 
pursue U.S. interests (not the interest of the “illusory” international community) in 
concert with U.S. values leading to a world that is more prosperous, democratic, and 
peaceful.10  In March 2006, President Bush published his second National Security 
Strategy (NSS) in which he rested national security on the two pillars of first promoting 
freedom, justice, and human dignity, and second confronting today’s challenges by 
                                                 
8  Ibrahim I. Ibrahim, "The American-Israeli Alliance: Raison d'Etat Revisited," Journal of Palestine 
Studies 15, no. 3 (Spring 1986), 23-25. 
9  Seth P. Tillman, The United States in the Middle East, Interests and Obstacles (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1982), 333. 
10  Condoleezza Rice, "Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest," Foreign Affairs 
(January/February 2000). 
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leading the growing community of democracies.11  The NSS outlines a number of 
“essential tasks” which, in this paper, will be called “national interests.” Those most 
pertinent to the topic of this thesis are to:  
• “Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to 
prevent attacks against us and our friends; 
• Work with others to defuse regional conflicts; 
• Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends 
with weapons of mass destruction (WMD); 
• [and] Expand the circle of development by opening societies and 
building the infrastructure of democracy.”12   
A scholar’s perspective on American interests is provided by Stephen Walt as he 
identified U.S. policy goals in the post 9/11 era as, “discourage security competition..., 
prevent the emergence of hostile great powers, promote a more open world economy, 
inhibit the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and expand democracy and 
respect for human rights...[while] the campaign against global terrorism is now the 
central aim of U.S. foreign and defense policy, and other international goals will be 
subordinated to this broad objective.”13  U.S. interest in Middle East oil is puzzlingly 
missing from the 2006 NSS. 
One cannot talk of the Middle East and national interest without mentioning oil.  
However, despite the strategic value of Middle East and North Africa (MENA), with its 
68 percent of all the world’s oil reserves, as Cordesman states, “The percentage of oil that 
flows directly to the United States ... has little or no strategic and economic importance. 
                                                 
11  President of the United States, The National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: The White House, 
2006), ii. 
12  Ibid., 1. 
13  Stephen M. Walt, "Beyond Bin Laden: Reshaping U.S. Foreign Policy," International Security 26, 
no. 3 (2001), 56-78. 
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Oil is a global commodity, and the United States must pay the same globally determined 
price as any nation.”14 Cordesman expounds upon this interest:  
The single most critical geopolitical issue affecting the region is whether 
the Middle East and North Africa will act as stable supplier of oil and gas 
exports at market-driven prices... The Middle East is so heavily dependent 
on the income from energy exports that few nations will voluntarily limit 
their export revenues.15  
The Bush Administration interestingly enough does not list the protection of the 
Middle East oil market as a national interest or a task to be protected in the National 
Security Strategy. Regardless, it does not follow that Middle East oil is not a concern for 
the Bush Administration or a national interest. Nonetheless, I have chosen to examine 
national interests that rose in the aftermath of 9/11, rather than pre-existing interests in 
the Middle East such as stability, oil, and regional peace.  
While the Bush Administration is certainly driving U.S. foreign policy, its 
priorities have by no means been fully embraced and are not without criticism from both 
the academic and policy community.  Brzezinski asserts that stability in the Middle East 
should be the primary goal of U.S. policy, due to the region’s energy production. He also 
warns against terrorism overshadowing other interests as, while he acknowledges 
terrorism as a problem, it does not threaten to take over the world.16 Jervis goes so far as 
to describe the Bush foreign policy as “faith based,” in that the idea that “more 
democracies will mean greater stability, peaceful relations with neighbors, and less 
terrorism,  [are] comforting claims that are questionable at best.”17   
In this thesis, the three “national interests” that will be assessed relative to the 
U.S. relationship with Israel are arguably the most important post-Cold War concerns for 
U.S. national security. Those are non-proliferation of WMD, combating terrorism, and 
                                                 
14  Anthony H. Cordesman, "The One True U.S. Strategic Interest in the Middle East:  Energy," 
Middle East Policy 8, no. 1 (March 2001), 117 and 119. 
15  Ibid., 124. 
16  Anne Joyce, "Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski," Middle East Policy 12, no. 2 (Summer 2005), 
120-1. 
17  Robert Jervis, American Foreign Policy in a New Era (New York and London: Routledge, Taylor 
& Francis Group, 2005), 82. 
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spreading democracy. Democracy and terrorism seemingly lead the pack of interests in 
the current administration’s policies and, “proliferation of nuclear, biological, and 
chemical weapons is widely recognized as the most serious threat to the national security 
of the United States.”18 
D. THE U.S.–ISRAELI RELATIONSHIP 
In 1948, the United States was the first country to recognize Israel. Much has 
been written about this relationship, which has been coined “passionate,” “special” and 
“strategic.” The works of Charles D. Smith, Donald Neff and William Quandt cover the 
history of Israel and the region to include the details of U.S. diplomacy and foreign 
policy.19 According to the Congressional Research Service, “Since 1948, the United 
States and Israel have developed a close friendship based on common democratic values, 
religious affinities, and security interests.”20 However, most literature focuses on the 
relationship itself in a historical context or directly related to the Arab-Israeli peace 
process. Others argue that it is not only the shared democratic values and Judeo-Christian 
values that lead to U.S. support of Israel, but also the American public’s general, 
“sentimental affection for the Holy Land, and a sense of responsibility for the security of 
a Jewish state after the Holocaust.”21 Whatever the normative values of supporting Israel, 
the existence of the relationship is not disputed. Evidence is provided by the amount of 
monetary aid the U.S. provides to Israel. “From 1976 to 2004, Israel was the largest 
cumulative recipient of U.S. foreign assistance, having recently been supplanted by Iraq. 
Since 1985, the United States has provided nearly $3 billion in grants annually to 
                                                 
18  Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (Washington, D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), 3. 
19  Donald Neff, Fallen Pillars: U.S. Policy Towards Palestine and Israel since 1945 (Washington, 
D.C: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1995), 350.; William B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy 
and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967, 3rd ed. (Washington, D.C; Berkeley: Brookings Institution Press; 
University of California Press, 2005), 535.; Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 4th 
ed. (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2001), 541.; Yossi Melman and Daniel Raviv, Friends in Deed: Inside 
the U.S.-Israel Alliance, 1st ed. (New York: Hyperion, 1994), 537.; George W. Ball and Douglas B. Ball, 
The Passionate Attachment: America's Involvement with Israel, 1947 to the Present (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 1992), 382. 
20  Carol Migdalovitz, Israel:  Background and Relations with the United States (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2006), i. 
21  Stuart E. Eizenstat, "Loving Israel. Warts and All," Foreign Policy, no. 81 (Winter 1990), 88. 
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Israel.”22 Support for Israel is bipartisan, as former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
remarked, “the support we gave Israel reflected not my personal preferences alone, but 
the basic national interests of the United States, transcending the accident of who might 
be in office at any particular time.”23 Most recognize U.S. favoritism of Israel and many 
believe the relationship goes further for as Neff states, “The evolution of (U.S.) policy 
has been almost invariably in a direction leading to a closer embrace of Israel’s policies 
at the expense of the Palestinians.”24 In the current administration, Condoleezza Rice has 
described Israel as a key ally in the Middle East.25 
While the relationship between the United States and Israel has been discussed 
above, the purpose of this thesis is not to conclude that the United States should either 
end or continue its relationship with Israel. The intent of this thesis is to identify how the 
relationship affects other United States interests in the Middle East. Should the thesis 
ultimately conclude that the relationship positively affects other U.S. interests in region, 
debate over the support of Israel should subside; the relationship would confirm the 
theory that states pursue diplomatic relations to further their own interests. If, however, 
the thesis conclusion shows that U.S. national interests in the Middle East are negligibly 
affected as a result of the U.S.-Israel relationship, further research would tackle the 
question of the extent of the support provided to Israel in relation to support provided to 
other nations. Finally, should the thesis conclude that the support the United States 
provides Israel negatively affects U.S. national interests in the region, it would not 
necessarily lead to a conclusion that the United States should no longer support Israel, or 
that there should necessarily be a notable change in the “special relationship.”  
A conclusion that suggests the U.S.–Israeli relationship negatively affects U.S. 
national interests in the Middle East would call for a greater debate of U.S. national 
interests in the Middle East. This thesis does not suggest that the United States should 
                                                 
22  Jeremy M. Sharp, U.S. Foreign Assistance to Israel (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service, Library of Congress, 2006), i. 
23  Henry Kissinger, "Friends Forever," Journal of Palestine Studies 6, no. 2 (Winter 1977), 178. 
24  Neff, Fallen Pillars: U.S. Policy Towards Palestine and Israel since 1945, 3. 
25  Rice, "Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest," Foreign Affairs. 
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withdraw its support for the existence of Israel. It does suggest that if there are possible 
negative effects to U.S. national interests in the Middle East — as a result of perceived 
support beyond what U.S. support is provided to other allies in the region — then it 
would necessitate further debate on U.S. policy and national interests in the Middle East. 
Regardless of any negative findings in this thesis, it is in the United States’ interest to 
ensure the survival of all its allies, and the U.S. is well known to come to the aid of 
threatened allies, as with the cases of South Korea and Kuwait. Negative conclusions in 
this thesis regarding the U.S.-Israeli relationship on other national interests in the Middle 
East do not affect the national interest of supporting the security of Israel.   
E. SUMMARY OF LITERATURE ON U.S.–ISRAELI RELATIONSHIP 
The motivation inspiring this thesis is the strong desire to learn about the Israel-
Arab conflict, coupled with a pragmatic realist perspective that U.S. foreign policy 
should be driven to support U.S. interests. I have provided a review of existing literature 
on the U.S.–Israeli relationship and have broken those works down into three categories: 
post-9/11, post-Cold War, and Cold War eras. Works focusing on the peace process, the 
Iraq War and not specifically on the U.S.–Israeli relationship in its entirety will not be 
included. The review will begin with the most recent works focusing on the 
Mearsheimer-Walt working paper, which boldly declared that the U.S.’s unwavering 
support of Israel jeopardizes U.S. security and called for more debate on U.S. national 
interests in the region and on the influence of the “Israeli Lobby.”26 While the paper has 
not broken a “taboo,” it has renewed the debate on the issue that has seemingly been 
quiet for a decade or more, except for a 2003 article in Social Text, which will be 
discussed.  
The main assertion of the working paper is that, “U.S. policy in the region (ME) is 
due almost entirely to U.S. domestic politics, and especially the activities of the ‘Israel 
Lobby’…no lobby has managed to divert U.S. foreign policy as far from what the 
American national interest would otherwise suggest, while simultaneously convincing 
                                                 
26  John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (March 
2006), 1 and 41. 
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Americans that U.S. and Israeli interests are essentially identical.”27 The paper does an 
excellent job of highlighting the influence of domestic politics and special interests 
(Israel Lobby) on U.S. foreign policy, as is the theme of the paper. While it also raises 
questions about what the U.S. interests in the Middle East are, a more in-depth study of 
how the relationship affects those most important national interests in the region — aside 
from special interests and domestic politics — is in order. One of the main criticisms of 
Mearsheimer and Walt is that their argument “exonerates” the U.S. by placing blame for 
bad U.S. policy not on it but elsewhere: with the Israel Lobby.28 While many appear to 
welcome the discussion of the U.S.-Israel relationship, Walt and Mearsheimer also 
received some very derogatory and somewhat passionate criticism for their views.29  
While describing the working paper as unremarkable, sloppy, and one-sided, 
Richard Cohen stated that he did not feel it to be anti-Semitic and argued that Israel 
deserves the special relationship due to the old argument of “shared values” between the 
U.S. and Israel. However, he fails to define those values and merely states, “isn’t there 
something bracing about a special relationship that is not based on oil or markets or 
strategic location but on shared values?”30 Max Boot declared the working paper to be as 
foolish as the works of Joe McCarthy and Robert Welch (Welch wrote a book 
maintaining President Eisenhower was a communist), while also describing it as one-
sided for not addressing the Saudi lobby. He concluded that the price of the U.S. 
relationship with Israel was cheap, for the U.S. never sent soldiers to protect Israel. He 
noted, “We have sent troops to save, among others, Britain, France, South Korea, South 
Vietnam, Kuwait and Kosovo. Today we risk war in defense of nations from Latvia to 
Taiwan, even though there is no good reason why their fate should matter to us any more 
than that of Israel.”31 A lengthy non-aligned article by Glenn Frankel, inspired by the 
                                                 
27  Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1. 
28  Mossad and Chomsky make such comments in, "The Israeli Lobby," Journal of Palestine Studies 
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29  Ibid. None of the six reviews presented here criticized Mearsheimer and Walt for their discussion 
of the U.S.-Israel relationship.  Most ferocious was a call of anti-Semitism in Eliot A. Cohen, "Yes, it's 
Anti-Semitic," The Washington Post April 5, 2006. 
30  Richard Cohen, "No, it's Not Anti-Semitic," The Washington Post April 25, 2006. 
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Mearsheimer and Walt working paper, noted the increase in American support for Israel 
post-9/11 and suggested that support has also increased from results of recent elections in 
Iran and with the Palestinians. “Americans have increasingly come to accept the idea that 
Israel and the United States share not just values but enemies. A Gallup Poll in February 
reported 68 percent of Americans have a favorable opinion of Israel with 23 percent 
unfavorable, and that Americans support Israelis over Palestinians by 59 percent to 15 
percent.”32   
While the Mearsheimer-Walt paper does declare that Israel is a problem for 
proliferation in the Middle East, a “liability” in the war on terror, and a questionable 
democracy, the work makes these broad accusations with seemingly insufficient study.  
Israel, as a strategic asset, gets a scant three pages, and Israel in relation to democracy is 
only discussed from the standpoint that its own democracy is questionable. Mearsheimer-
Walt assert Israel is a democracy for Jews only, and Israel, in relation to U.S. promotion 
of democracy, is not discussed. 
Another post-9/11 work was by Stanford’s Department of History Professor Joel 
Beinin entitled, “The Israelization of American Middle East Policy Discourse,” published 
in Duke University’s Social Text. His work highlights the new mission of the U.S.-Israel 
relationship in the post-Cold War era as having been defined as allies against political 
Islam. But he does not concur with this assessment, since he states that the terrorism of 
Hamas and Hizballah differs from that of al Qaeda. Hizballah even denounced the 9/11 
attacks, and the group had reason for its attacks against Americans in the early 1980s 
when the U.S. seemingly sided with Israel in its invasion of Lebanon. He concludes that 
the unconditional U.S. support for Israel will lead to grief for Americans and the people 
in the Middle East.33  
In the early and mid-1990s, some new perspectives on the U.S.–Israeli 
relationship were published. Paul Findley, a former Congressman, blames the Israel 
                                                 
32  Glenn Frankel, "A Beautiful Friendship?; in Search of the Truth about the Israel Lobby's Influence 
on Washington," The Washington Post, July 16, 2006. 
33  Beinin, “The Israelization of American Middle East Policy Discourse,” Social Text vol. 21, no. 2 
(Summer 2003), 136. 
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lobby for the United States’ one-sided relationship in the Middle East conflict, He calls 
for the U.S. to halt aid to Israel and coerce Israel to accept UN Resolution 242.34 Findley 
also notes that Israel has not always acted as an ally, referencing acts of spying and the 
USS Liberty incident; however, he does not address questions of whether there is any 
value in the relationship regarding U.S. national interests of WMD proliferation, 
terrorism, and the spread of democracy. Another book depicting the relationship between 
the U.S. and Israel is Friends in Deed, which chronologically examines the existence of 
the relationship, but does not address the impact on American national interests.35  
A valuable work questioning the “strategic” importance of Israel in U.S.–Israeli 
relations is US-Israeli Strategic Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Era: An American 
Perspective, by Karen Puschel.36 In her work, Puschel believes the relationship should be 
just that, a relationship, as there is little “strategic” value for the U.S. with the demise of 
the Cold War. She concluded that U.S. interests in Israel in the aftermath of the Cold War 
were spawned out of a sense of loyalty.  Her assessment of Israel’s strategic importance 
to the U.S. focuses on its military value as an ally and its location in the Middle East, 
concluding that Israel is not important for the U.S. in that sense. Puschel’s book does not 
address U.S. interests such as democracy, combating terrorism, or proliferation of WMD.  
The Passionate Attachment is a work describing the relationship between the U.S. 
and Israel since its inception. Chronologically, it criticizes U.S. one-sidedness in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, concludes that the relationship hurts U.S. influence in the region, 
and that the United States should pressure Israel to conclude the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
U.S. values are not the same as Israel’s because, the book asserts, Israel has abused 
Palestinians for fifty years.37 None of the books published in the post-Cold War era 
                                                 
34  Paul Findley, Deliberate Deceptions: Facing the Facts about the U.S.–Israeli Relationship, 2nd ed. 
(Chicago, Ill: Lawrence Hill Books, 1995), 326. 
35  Melman and Raviv, Friends in Deed: Inside the U.S.-Israel Alliance, 537. 
36  Karen L. Puschel, US-Israeli Strategic Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Era: An American 
Perspective (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 184. 
37  Ball and Ball, The Passionate Attachment: America's Involvement with Israel, 1947 to the Present, 
382. 
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assess the U.S.–Israeli relationship in terms of today’s national interests (outside of an 
interest in the conclusion of the peace process) in the region. 
Several books and articles were published in the 1980s, during the Cold War, 
which discussed the relationship between the United States and Israel. Four works that 
argued the benefits of the relationship for the U.S. are positive are: (1) American Public 
Opinion toward Israel and the Arab-Israel Conflict; (2) The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict:  
Making America’s Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan; (3) The $36 Billion 
Bargain:  Strategy and Politics in U.S. Assistance to Israel, and (4) The American-Israeli 
Alliance:  Raison D’etat Revisited.38 Gilboa argues that U.S. support of Israel is backed 
by American public opinion, although not as unconditionally as the U.S. government 
supports Israel. Gilboa further argued that military support and economic aid for Israel is 
not supported any more than that of other countries.39 Spiegel argued that the president 
and his advisors are most important in decision making on foreign policy, that global 
interests outweighed regional interests in the Middle East and, finally, that Israel has in 
fact served as a proxy for U.S. interests — such as when Israel played a role with Iran 
and the contras.40 Organski argued that U.S. support of Israel has been a bargain for the 
United States. The United States sends money and military aid to Israel, and then Israel 
conducts operations to support U.S. interest — such as limiting Soviet influence and 
checking Arab radicalism.41 Ibrahim’s article provided an interesting outlook on the 
relationship between the U.S. and Israel. He argued that the U.S. does act with U.S.  
 
 
                                                 
38  Eytan Gilboa, American Public Opinion Toward Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Lexington, 
Mass: Lexington Books, 1987), 366; Steven L. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America's 
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40  Steven L. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America's Middle East Policy, from 
Truman to Reagan; and Moughrabi, The U.S.-Israel Relationship, 137. 
41  Organski, The $36 Billion Bargain: Strategy and Politics in U.S. Assistance to Israel, 315; John 
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national interests in its dealings with Israel. The U.S. sponsors Israel as the Middle East 
“policeman” to promote Arab disunity and prevent Arab nationalism by using Israel to 
act in the role of a proxy.42   
Three works that countered the argument that the U.S. and Israeli relationship 
serves the national interest are (1) The United States in the Middle East: Interests and 
Obstacles; (2) Taking Sides: America’s Secret Relations with a Militant Israel; and (3) 
Israel and the American National Interest: A Critical Examination.43 Tillman argued that 
Israel and its security was an interest for the U.S. and that it often supplanted other 
interests such as adherence to principles of peaceful settlement and the rights of self-
determination.44 Tillman further argued that Pro-Israeli forces, who when efforts were 
made to push American interests in the Middle East, have the influence to change 
political issues from foreign to domestic.45 Green’s work is an historical account of the 
relationship between Israel and the United States. He argued that the U.S. has treated 
Israel as the 51st state, despite Israel often not acting in accordance with U.S. interests. He 
cites Israel’s attack on the USS Liberty and its nuclear program as evidence. Rubenburg 
argued that the U.S.–Israeli relationship has not worked in U.S. interests because Soviet 
influence has spread in the Middle East as a result.46 Additionally, Rubenburg identifies 
Israeli interests that are not aligned to U.S. interests — such as Israeli interests in 
maintaining the territorial status quo and pursuing an ethnically pure Israel.47 
Rubenburg’s book is presented in a chronological fashion, using six major events for her 
argument; however, her argument certainly does not present the relationship from the 
perspective of current U.S. national interests in the region. Not surprisingly, the sources 
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written with Cold War interests at hand did not address the Israeli and U.S. relationship 
in regards to today’s U.S. national interests in the Middle East. 
The literature on the U.S.–Israeli relationship does not address the relationship 
from the perspective of how that relationship affects U.S. national interests of non-
proliferation of WMD, combating terrorism, and spreading democracy. This thesis is 
intended to fill that gap in knowledge by presenting the effect of the “special” 
relationship in a new perspective. 
F. ORGANIZATION   
This thesis assesses three national interests that the United States has in the 
Middle East. It determines that the relationship with Israel should be further studied, 
outside the purview of domestic politics, and with an eye that emphasizes the security of 
the United States.  The three national interests addressed in this paper are prevention of 
WMD proliferation, combating terrorism, and democracy promotion. Each U.S. national 
interest identified is treated as its own case study and assessed with Iran, Syria, and Egypt 
— each being a case study for each interest.  
Chapter II is on the U.S. national interest of WMD non-proliferation in the 
Middle East and presented by case studies of Iran, Syria, and Egypt. The chapter covers 
events from the 1960s to the present day. Introducing the case study is a synopsis on 
Israel’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, Israel’s WMD arsenal, and then various rationales for 
proliferation before beginning the three state case studies. The Iran, Syria and Egypt 
WMD non-proliferation case studies are each promulgated individually. Each country 
case study is presented in a similar manner. First, the state’s estimated WMD programs 
are presented to highlight what each country is believed to possess and be capable of 
producing. Second, the state’s regional security environment is assessed to determine its 
threats focusing on its regional security issues. Then, each state’s desire to be a regional 
power is assessed to determine what role WMD play in the state’s desire for prestige. An 
assessment of the state’s regional security threats and its desire for prestige determines 
whether Israel is a primary factor for each state’s WMD programs. Proliferation scholars, 
government reports, international agency reports, and government officials’ statements 
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are all used to capture each state’s WMD programs, regional security environment, and 
power aspirations. The chapter concludes that, although not the main driver for 
proliferation in the Middle East, Israel and U.S. perceived hypocrisy on proliferation do 
negatively affect proliferation, especially in the case of Syria. 
Chapter III, on the U.S. national interest of promoting democracy in the Middle 
East, also uses the case studies of Iran, Syria, and Egypt. The democracy promotion case 
study for each of the three states will be confined to each state’s current regime, with the 
exception of Syria, covering both the Bashar al-Asad and Hafez al-Asad regimes. A 
synopsis of the factors that make democratic liberalization difficult in the Middle East — 
from current scholarly sources — is presented to identify the challenges of democratic 
reform in the region. Each state study is presented individually, first with a description of 
the current regime and its form of government, followed by an analysis of its regime’s 
willingness to reform. Research on regime policies, statements, and actions is presented 
to determine whether the state refers to Israel as a threat or to the Israeli form of 
government as a means to combat initiatives pushing for liberalization and legitimizing 
authoritarianism. The chapter concludes that the U.S.–Israeli relationship is not a factor 
in the continued authoritarian regimes in Iran and Egypt, but the relationship does have a 
slightly negative effect on Syria’s regime opponents’ ability to implement political 
reforms.  
Chapter IV, on the U.S. national interest of combating terrorism in the Middle 
East, also uses the case studies of Iran, Syria, and Egypt to determine whether the U.S.–
Israeli relationship affects the success of U.S. objectives. The combating terrorism 
national interest case study is confined to the current regimes of each of the three 
countries, except for Syria, which will cover both the Bashar al-Assad and Hafez al-
Assad regimes. A discussion on the enemy in the war on terror is conducted to provide a 
framework for the chapter analysis. Each case study identifies each state’s relationship 
with terrorism, its rationale for its position towards terrorism, and the effect of the U.S.–
Iraeli relationship on the state’s position on terrorism. The chapter concludes that the U.S. 
interest of combating terrorism is negatively affected by the U.S.–Israeli relationship in 
the case studies of Iran and Syria. The case study on Egypt concludes that the U.S.–
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Israeli relationship effect on the U.S. national interest of combating terrorism only 
somewhat negatively affects the war on terrorism due to the population’s anti-
Americanism and sympathy for terrorist groups.  
Chapter V provides an overall conclusion of the U.S.–Israeli relationship’s effect 
on other U.S. national interests in the Middle East, respective to the interests and states 
studied in this thesis. While the thesis highlights possible interests and areas where U.S. 
national interests are not well-served by the U.S.–Israeli relationship, the thesis does not 
conclude that the U.S. should withdraw support of Israel. It is in U.S. interests to support 
the existence of its allies. However, the thesis does conclude that greater objective debate 
should take place to assess the U.S.–Israeli relationship with respect to other U.S. 
national interests in the Middle East, and to ensure U.S. national security is best served 
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II. NONPROLIFERATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter on nonproliferation in the Middle East seeks to identify how Israel’s 
de facto nuclear weapons program affects proliferation in the Middle East. First the 
chapter will provide a synopsis of Israel’s road to becoming a nuclear power, identifying 
France as most directly involved in Israel’s nuclear achievement. The chapter will also 
provide the United States’ diplomacy and response during this time period in reference to 
Israel’s nuclear program. Israel’s WMD programs will be identified through unclassified 
assessments. The chapter will discuss the Israeli strategic rationale for its WMD 
programs and then discuss rationales scholars identify as those that cause states to 
proliferate. Then the case studies of Iran, Syria, and Egypt will be included with each 
identifying the respective country’s WMD programs strategic context, and rationale for 
proliferation. The chapter will conclude with an assessment of the relationship of Israel 
and its WMD programs to proliferation in the Middle East.     
B. ISRAEL’S ROAD TO THE BOMB 
While France most directly helped Israel achieve its objective of being a nuclear 
power, the United States also helped by not pressuring Israel to remain nuclear free and 
allowing Israel to be the only nuclear elephant in the Middle East and thus ensuring that 
others will attempt to follow. This section will discuss France’s involvement in 
supporting Israel’s pursuit of the bomb. The section will then explain how different 
United States administrations responded to Israel along its road to nuclear power.               
The U.S. was not the first country to provide Israel military arms, nor was the 
U.S. Israel’s primary military partner for the first two decades of the state Israel’s 
existence. After being rebuffed by Eisenhower, Israel turned to France for security 
assistance. After Nasser secured a deal with the Soviets in 1955 for the transfer of arms to 
Egypt, Ben Gurion began desperate pleas to President Eisenhower for military assistance 
fearing a coming imbalance that would jeopardize Israel’s security.  Eisenhower 
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responded to Ben Gurion’s pleas in a March 1956 press conference, “We are trying to 
prevent an arms race in the region. Clearly 1.7 million [the total Israeli population in 
1956] cannot absorb arms like 40 million [the number of inhabitants of Israel’s 
immediate Arab neighbors].”48 The devastated Israelis failed to come to grips with such a 
bleak outlook and contacted the French.  
Israel’s intent to contact France in reference to nuclear assistance came after the 
1956 Suez Canal debacle as Israel had joined Britain and France in attempting to regain 
the Suez after Nasser seized it in July 1956. As Cohen has noted, “at the height of the 
crisis, Soviet Primier Nikoli Bulganin had warned Ben Gurion that Soviet missiles could 
reach Israeli targets.”49 As France could not provide Israel with a security guarantee, the 
Ben Gurion confidant, Shimon Peres, suggested that France provide Israel with nuclear 
assistance, which ultimately got underway in a loose fashion to allow deniability of 
elements in the agreement but in the end, “Saint Gobain Nucleaire, the company that built 
the Marcoule [France reactor site] plant, would be the primary contractor for an 
underground plutonium separation plant at the reactor site [Dimona] — giving Israel an 
unprecedented type of assistance.”50 Despite some awareness by members of the 
Eisenhower administration of the Israeli and French work at the Dimona reactor site, no 
action was taken.   
Prior to the arrival of President Kennedy, there was no coherent U.S. policy on 
nonproliferation and the nuclear proliferation treaty (NPT) was not even in the works. As 
Cohen noted, “John F. Kennedy was the first president who came to the White House 
personally convinced that the spread of nuclear weapons to new nations would create a 
more dangerous world and undermine U.S. global influence.”51  Believing nuclear 
proliferation was a nightmare, “Kennedy pressed Israel on the matter of Dimona during 
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the first half of 1961. He made it clear to his administration that he had a ‘personal 
interest’ in the issue of Dimona and considered it a high foreign policy priority.”52 
Regarding nonproliferation, a state department memo clearly identified U.S. interests 
pertaining to proliferation in the Middle East and Israel atomic activities specifically, “the 
memo defined them (U.S. interests) as (in) opposition to proliferation in general and a 
particular concern that, in response to Israeli weapons, the Soviets might station nuclear 
weapons on Arab soil.”53 Although Kennedy did begin arms sales to Israel, he did so in 
response to Cold War balancing as the Soviets delivered MIGs to Egypt. It is important to 
note that Kennedy sought to address Israel’s security gap by providing HAWK surface to 
surface air missiles with the conditions of reassurance that Israel would not pursue 
nuclear weapons.54 After receiving intelligence information that Israel was close to a 
nuclear weapon, “Kennedy used the most powerful sanction that an U.S. president could 
ever use against Israel: if Israel did not allow American visits to Dimona, under 
Kennedy’s tough conditions, he threatened to deprive Israel of the U.S. commitment to 
ensuring Israel’s security.”55 It is unclear whether Ben Gurion resigned as Israel’s prime 
minister as a result of the tensions between the U.S. and Israel but his replacement, Prime 
Minister Eshkol seemed to accept President Kennedy’s demands and, “It looked as if 
American diplomacy had won in the Israeli nuclear case: Israel accepted an arrangement 
by which it committed itself, in words and deeds, to nonproliferation.”56 With the death 
of President Kennedy, the execution of the agreement would be passed to President 
Johnson. 
President Johnson had a long track record of support for Israel from his days in 
Congress, and he tipped his hand early to an Israeli diplomat in the aftermath of 
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Kennedy’s death, “You have lost a great friend…but you have found a better one.”57 One 
area that President Johnson can be held into account was the failure of ensuring 
transparency during U.S. inspections of the Dimona facility as, “the visits were halted 
when scientists reported they were so constrained by Israeli authorities that they could 
not certify there were no bombs being made.”58 President Johnson avoided the issue of 
Israel’s nuclear weapons program and instead maintained his relations with Israel, 
pleasing his pro-Israeli political supporters.  Another case of President Johnson not 
standing up to Israel was the Israeli request for 30 A-4 Skyhawks and 50 F-4 Phantoms. 
As a condition of the deal, President Johnson attempted to secure Israel’s support for 
United Nations resolution 242 and to renew Israel’s pledge not to go nuclear.  However, 
the president’s position softened when in October 1968 before elections the Pro-Israeli 
lobby had 70 U.S. senators sign a letter supporting the Phantom deal. The deal was 
ultimately approved and the U.S. failed to get the assurance of Israel to renounce nuclear 
weapons and sign the NPT. It is important to note that during this period, Israel had faced 
a potential existential threat from hostile neighbors, who despite having been soundly 
defeated by Israel in 1967, had not made peace and in fact maintained hostile relations. 
The Johnson administration had legitimate concerns for the existence of Israel in addition 
to concerns of nuclear proliferation, which still had not had established norms. Once 
Israel’s bomb had become a reality, President Johnson exhibited his denial of Israel’s 
nuclear program for, “By 1968, the CIA was convinced Israel had produced nuclear 
weapons, or was capable of doing so, and informed President Johnson. His response was 
to order the CIA not to inform any other members of the administration, including 
Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk, he made no 
known use at all of the information.”59 President Johnson’s failures in reversing the 
course of Israel’s nuclear weapons program are still being felt today.  By the time 
President Nixon was in office, Israel had been a nuclear power. In September 1969, 
Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir “told Nixon the truth — why Israel had found itself 
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compelled to develop a nuclear weapons capability and why it could not sign the NPT — 
but pledged that Israel would not become a declared nuclear power.”60 The concept of 
nuclear opacity was born and lives on today. 
This section concludes that France helped Israel achieve the bomb and through an 
ever increasing amount of support for Israel by presidential administrations, it was 
President Johnson’s administration that neglected to take decisive action to ensure the 
Middle East remained free from nuclear weapons.  
C. THE ISRAELI WMD ARSENAL 
Despite the opacity, Israel is widely believed to have a de facto nuclear program 
but is not a member of the NPT.  Based on an assessment that Dimona became 
operational in 1964 producing weapons grade plutonium, Israel is said to have between 
530 and 684 kilograms of plutonium necessary for nuclear weapons.61 Further 
assumptions conclude, that with that much nuclear weapons grade plutonium, Israel is 
estimated to have between 130 to 170 nuclear weapons or based on more conservative 
numbers assuming 5 kilograms per warhead vice 4 kilogram each, Israel would still 
possess between 105 to 135 nuclear weapons. Israel, “is capable of delivering nuclear 
weapons by aircraft, ballistic missiles, and ship- and submarine-launched cruise 
missiles.”62   
Israel is also believed to have both chemical and biological weapons programs. 
While Israel signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) it has not been ratified.  
Having signed the CWC in 1993, “Israeli officials have opted not to ratify it because 
Syria is believed to have substantial holdings of chemical weapons and has not signed the 
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treaty.”63 As for biological weapons, Israel is not a member of the Biological Weapons 
Convention (BWC). The informative Deadly Arsenals quotes Avner Cohen pertaining to 
Israel’s chemical and biological weapons programs as, 
 
A near-consensus exists among experts – based on anecdotal evidence and 
intelligence leaks – that Israel developed, produced, stockpiled, and maybe 
even deployed chemical weapons at some point in its history.’  As to 
biological weapons, however, Cohen is more cautious and tentative:  ‘It 
would be logical – given the experience in Iraq- that Israel has acquired 
expertise in most aspects of weaponization, with possible exception of 
testing.  Although highly doubtful that Israel engages in the ongoing 
production or stockpiling of BW agents.64  
 
Israel’s nuclear weapons program provides it a decisive security advantage in the region 
for it is currently the sole member of the nuclear weapons club in the Middle East.      
Israel pursued a nuclear weapons program to deter an existential threat and 
counter its vulnerabilities due to its small size and population as opposed to its Arab 
neighbors. As former Israeli Prime Minister and aide to Ben Gurion during the initial 
planning of the nuclear program Shimon Peres stated, “We didn’t build this (nuclear) 
option to get to Hiroshima, but rather to Oslo. We felt that the reason Israel was attacked 
several times, without any provocation, was because some of our neighbors thought they 
could overpower us, and we wanted to create a situation in which this temptation would 
no longer exist.”65 Israel is not likely to give up its nuclear arsenal any time soon, as its 
so-called formal policy of “the long corridor” holds that dismantling their nuclear 
weapons will not be discussed before a comprehensive peace is reached with all the states 
in the region, to include Iran.66 As Einhorn wrote, “As long as the Israelis face what they 
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regard as an existential threat, they are going to be reluctant to surrender what they see as 
an ultimate guarantor of their security.”67 A difficulty in the region is Israel’s “Begin 
Doctrine,” which contends that Israel will not allow a hostile power to develop nuclear 
weapons as demonstrated with its preventative attack on Iraq’s nuclear site in 1981. The 
policy seemingly applies to Iran as well for Israel contends, “that Tehran, equipped with 
such weapons, would step up its support for anti-Israel terrorism, encourage other 
regional states to develop a similar capacity, and shatter the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime.”68 As a critic of Israel’s over reliance on the deterrent value of its nuclear 
arsenal, Bar-Joseph writes that other than Iraq not launching non-conventional Scuds, for 
which it cannot be determined whether this was due to the fear of a nuclear retaliation, 
“There is no other known instance in which an anti-Israeli action was deterred by Israel’s 
nuclear capabilities. In other words, Israel’s nuclear capability is a fine example of a 
successful response to a non-existent threat…Israel’s image as a nuclear state has 
encouraged other regional powers to pursue a similar status.”69 As such Bar-Joseph 
further argues that “Israel’s nuclear arsenal should be eliminated, to remove the pretext 
for hostile actors attaining nuclear weapons.”70 Israel is an example of a state’s primary 
motive for seeking nuclear weapons, security. For, as Mearsheimer states, “Israelis often 
worry that if the Arab states ever inflicted a decisive defeat on Israel, they would impose 
a Carthaginian peace.”71 Israel sought its nuclear weapons for the most compelling 
reason that states proliferate: security.   
D. RATIONALES FOR PROLIFERATION 
There are a number of reasons that states will choose to proliferate their arsenals 
and pursue WMD. Leading all the various rationales is security.  In today’s world, “the 
danger is that many countries might view nuclear weapons as useful, even essential, 
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instruments to maintain security in a Hobbesian world where life is ‘poor, nasty, brutish, 
and short.’”72 It is feared that one new entry to the nuclear club would spark a domino 
effect, especially in tense regions such as the Middle East. Reasons for pursuit of a 
nuclear weapons program include “the desire to intimidate and coerce rivals, the search 
for enhanced security against regional or international rivals, the status and prestige 
associated with mastering nuclear technology and domestic politics and bureaucratic self-
aggrandizement.”73 There are also disincentives for pursuing nuclear weapons as well 
and they are, “financial cost, technical difficulty, domestic opposition, damage to 
important bilateral relationships or collective security alliances, and global 
nonproliferation norms.”74 Despite the disincentives that exist, “there is widespread 
concern that the calculus of incentives and disincentives has shifted during the past 
decade, with incentives increasing and disincentives declining. New threats have arisen 
while the nuclear taboo has weakened.”75  Many states today see their greatest threat 
from the U.S. as it behaves more unilaterally towards hostile regimes.  States also see that 
there have not been severe consequences for states such as India, Pakistan, and Israel who 
went nuclear outside the nonproliferation regime. In fact there have been advantages to 
defying nonproliferation as each of the three countries that went nuclear furthered their 
prestige, influence, and relations with the United States. To answer the question of how 
the U.S. relation with Israel affects the U.S. objective of nonproliferation, it will be 
determined by identifying whether the states proliferate with the primary motive of 
balancing against Israel. 
E. IRAN AND WMD 
While Iran’s chemical and biological weapons program were developed as a 
deterrent to Iraq, Iran’s current nuclear program does not exist primarily to counter the 
Israeli nuclear program but more for its desire to be a regional power and protect its 
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interests from the United States.  Therefore, Iran’s WMD programs are negligibly 
affected by the U.S.–Israeli relationship. This section identifies the assessed Iranian 
WMD programs. This section further examines Iran’s security and geo-political position. 
The section concludes that Iran’s desire to be a regional power and to provide security 
against the United States has led it to pursue nuclear weapons.     
Iran is believed to have chemical and biological weapons and is also believed to 
be pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. Iran is a member of both the BWC and the 
CWC having ratified the conventions in 1973 and 1997 respectively. Despite being a 
member of the BWC, “U.S. intelligence reports from 2003 claim that Iran probably 
maintains an ‘offensive biological weapons program,’ with the capability to produce 
small quantities of biological weapon (BW) agents but limited ability to weaponize 
them.”76  As for the Iranian chemical weapons program, it was started in the 1980s 
during the Iran-Iraq war and, “The CIA believes that Iran likely possesses both a 
stockpile of blister, blood, choking, and probably nerve agents and also the bombs and 
artillery shells to deliver them, which it had previously manufactured.”77 Iran has security 
concerns and has a memory of being the recipient of chemical attacks from Iran and 
surely maintains stockpiles as a deterrent from future attacks. As Takeyh writes,  
Iraq’s employment of chemical weapons against Iranian civilians and 
combatants led to an estimated 50,000 casualties and permanently scarred 
Iran’s national psyche.  Far from being a historical memory, the war and 
its legacy are debated daily in the pages of newspapers, in the halls of 
universities and the floor of the parliament.  As the newspaper Ya-Letharat 
recently noted, ‘One can still see the wounds on our war veterans that 
were inflicted by poison gas as used by Saddam Hussein that were made 
in Germany and France.’78 
Israel did not play a factor in either Iran’s biological or chemical weapons programs. 
The United States has very good reason to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear 
power. Specifically, “The United States has four interests that could be jeopardized by a 
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nuclear-armed Iran with a long-range means of delivery: preserving the safety of U.S. 
territory, retaining the ability to use U.S. conventional forces freely in the Middle East, 
sustaining nonproliferation regimes, and maintaining the willingness of allies and friends 
to work in coalition with the United States.”79 Initial surprise as to the capability of the 
Iranian nuclear weapons program “came in August 2002 with the discovery of the Natanz 
installation that demonstrated Iranian mastery of the complex process of enriching nearly 
weapon-grade uranium.”80  As declared by one of Iran’s influential former presidents, 
“That we are on the verge of a nuclear breakout is true.”81 There are conflicting estimates 
as to how close Iran is to having the capability of producing a nuclear weapon. Deadly 
Arsenals declares, “If Iran’s nuclear activities continued without outside constraint and 
without outside assistance, it could take several years for Iran to build and operate a fully 
functioning uranium enrichment ‘cascade’ and an additional one to two years for that 
facility to produce enough weapons-grade material for the country’s first nuclear 
device.”82 The latest on Iranian progress on the nuclear front came from and IAEA 
inspection in mid-May 2007, which “reportedly found that Iran had mastered centrifuge 
technology to the point where it could make enriched uranium for reactor use and was 
running at least 1,300 of them, with plans to add more imminently.”83  Takeyh even 
concludes that hedging is the only remaining solution as he states, “the best that the 
international community can hope for at this late stage is for Iran to emulate the position 
of Japan, a country with an advanced nuclear capability that has not actually proceeded to 
build a bomb.”84 As the Iranian nuclear program seems evident, it is important to explore 
why Iran seeks nuclear weapons and how Israel factors into that equation. 
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A look at Iran’s security environment and place in the geo-political arena 
discovers that although Israel’s de facto nuclear weapons program is a partial factor in 
Iran’s pursuit of their own nuclear weapon, it is far from the leading determinant. One 
Israeli analyst indicated that the Iranians felt a much greater threat from Iraq, prior to 
Saddam’s ouster, than from Israel and that Iran does not particularly worry about a 
nuclear attack from Israel as their main concerns were Iraq and the U.S.85 Israel’s nuclear 
program has rhetorical value for Iran as,  
The alarmist Iranian rhetoric regarding the immediacy of the Israeli threat 
is more an attempt to mobilise domestic and regional constituencies 
behind an anti-Israel policy than a genuine reflection of concern. For the 
Islamic Republic, Israel may be an ideological affront and a civilisational 
challenge, but it is not an existential threat mandating provision of nuclear 
weapons.86  
For many Iranians, nuclear aspirations are driven by a sense of national pride, as 
such technology would bring Iran closer to its glory of the past. Sagan writes that Iran, 
along with North Korea and previously Iraq, all believed that “America can be held at 
bay only by deterrence.  Weapons of mass destruction are the only means by which they 
can hope to deter the United States.”87 It is also believed in some corners that U.S. 
military actions in Iraq have had an impact on Iranian desires, for “Iran’s conservative 
clerical masters will only see in Saddam Hussein’s fate an even greater reason to pursue 
nuclear weapons in the hope of fending off the United States.”88 Due to Iran’s national 
pride, a desire for prestige, a desire to be a regional power, and a desire for enhanced 
security due to a multitude of perceived threats (with the U.S. being the primary threat), 
Iran has been developing a nuclear program. However, neither the Iranian C/BW 
programs or the nuclear program are driven due to the de facto Israel nuclear threat and, 
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therefore, the U.S. relationship with Israel and Israel’s de facto nuclear weapons  
have a negligible effect on Iranian proliferation. 
F. SYRIA AND WMD 
Syria’s WMD programs can be directly attributed to the threat it perceives from 
Israel and the Israeli nuclear program, which results in the conclusion that the U.S.–
Israeli relationship negatively affects the objective of nonproliferation in the Middle East. 
This section will identify Syria’s WMD programs, its strategic context within the region, 
and its rationale for proliferation. The section concludes that the U.S –Israeli relationship 
negatively affects the interest of nonproliferation in the Middle East in the case of Syria 
and its WMD programs. 
Syria reportedly does not have a serious nuclear weapons program at this time but 
does have a biological weapons research program with suspected weapons and is 
believed to also have a significant chemical weapons program and stockpile. As Syria is 
still in the early stages of a reprocessing capacity, “it seems unlikely that Syrians have 
reached an advanced level of nuclear expertise that could be applied to a weapons 
program.”89 The Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Monterey Institute of 
International Studies solidly concludes, “Syria has no nuclear weapons program.  Nor 
does Syria have the capability of producing biological weapons.”90 Syria also lacks the 
financial backing for such a program and has had problems with obtaining technical 
assistance due to political pressures on potential sellers.91 Deadly Arsenals concludes that 
Syria has a known biological research program but has not begun any major effort to 
produce biological agents or weaponize them.92 Syria is believed to have stockpiled 
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significant amounts of the nerve agent sarin and reportedly weaponized sarin for delivery 
via Scud-B missiles.93 Syria is not a party to either the CWC or BWC.   
Syria’s proliferation efforts of chemical and biological weapons programs can be 
linked specifically to counter the threat from Israel and its WMD arsenal. Syria is not 
believed to be seeking the ancient “Greater Syria” nor does it seek self-aggrandizement, 
however, it does appear that Syria’s pursuit of chemical weapons, “is directly related to 
its two inter-related strategic objectives: one to deter Israel from attacking Syria, the other 
to contain Israel within 1967 borders.”94 Syria sought nonconventional arms to provide a 
deterrent to Israel, since Syria could not achieve conventional parity and will not forgo its 
chemical arsenal, “unless its principal adversary is also obliged to do so with respects to 
its nuclear weapons.  [The late] President Hafez Asad indirectly acknowledged his 
chemical weapons program…, ‘Those who have nuclear weapons do not have the right to 
criticize others regarding any weapon, which they possess.  If they want disarmament, we 
should start with the nuclear ones.  We, the Arabs, are ready to get rid of other 
weapons.’”95 Israel is a threat from the Syria perspective as it views Israel as, “a scion of 
imperialism, as an aggressive, expansionist, settler-colonial state: Israel colonized 
Palestine; tossed out one segment of its local Palestinian inhabitants from their ancestral 
homes; maintained a brutal occupation over the other segment and, at various times, 
invaded each and every one of its neighbors, occupying parts of their territory, and this in 
flagrant violation of international law.”96 While many may argue the validity of Syria’s 
views, it nonetheless believes Israel to be a threat and seeks to deter Israel via its WMD.    
Syria often seeks the high ground and proposes a nuclear free Middle East to no 
avail as the U.S. and other states weakly reply that timing is not right for such a move. 
“In 2003, its two-year rotation on the Security Council was dwindling down, Syria 
pressed for a new resolution calling for a Middle Eat nuclear-free zone.  Several 
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permanent members, including the United States, found the Syrian initiative ill timed and 
ill conceived.”97  Syria has also declared that it would not consider forgoing its chemical 
weapons until there was a regional ban on nuclear weapons. So long as the U.S. sees 
Syria’s chemical weapons as undesirable, the rationale for their existence is an attempt to 
balance against Israel’s nuclear weapons, therefore, the U.S. “special” relationship with 
Israel negatively affects U.S. interests of nonproliferation in Syria. However, should 
Syria expand its program in a nuclear direction, U.S. foreign policy in the region just as 
well as Israel’s nuclear program can share equal blame as Asad’s primary goal is to 
remain in power and he may determine that a clandestine nuclear program is the best 
means to do so. Syria witnessed the failure of WMD to deter the U.S. from invading Iraq. 
As Syria has been in the U.S. sights for its support of anti-Israel terrorist groups and for 
its chemical weapons program, should Syria decide to go nuclear, it would be to balance 
against the threat from the U.S.   
This section has concluded that Syria’s proliferation of WMD was to deter Israel, 
therefore, the U.S. relationship with Israel and Israel’s WMD program negatively affect 
the objective of nonproliferation in the Middle East in the case of Syria. While others 
may argue that Syria has offensive motives in its pursuit to balance against Israel’s 
military might, it nonetheless follows that Syria has pursued its WMD programs in 
response to Israel’s programs. This section further concluded that any additional 
proliferation on the part of Syria would be to deter the U.S. from threatening the Asad 
regime. The U.S.–Israeli relationship negatively affected proliferation in the Middle East 
in the case of Syria. 
G. EGYPT AND WMD 
The U.S. national interest of nonproliferation of WMD in the Middle East is 
negligibly affected by the U.S.–Israeli relationship regarding the Egyptian case study.  
Although Egypt did develop its chemical and biological weapons in response to the 
Israeli threat and its activity at the Dimona nuclear site in the 1960s, Nasser was likely to 
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develop such weapons anyway as the self-proclaimed leader of the Arab world, which 
requires a formidable military with the latest weapons. Chemical and biological weapons 
were readily obtainable for their affordability and ease of manufacture. Despite Egypt 
forgoing a pursuit of nuclear weapons, it is technologically capable but does not do so as 
it is financially challenged. The U.S.–Israeli relationship does not appear to significantly 
affect Egypt’s decision to proliferate. 
Egypt does possess both a chemical and biological weapons capability and 
created such programs to protect against Israel and to fashion itself as the leader of the 
Arab world. Egypt is not a member of either the CWC or the BWC. It is believed that 
Egypt began a biological weapons program in the 1960s and the U.S. reported, “by 1972, 
Egypt had developed biological warfare agents and that there was ‘no evidence to 
indicate that Egypt had eliminated this capability and it remains likely that the Egyptian 
capability to conduct biological warfare continues to exist.’ Egyptian officials assert that 
Egypt has never developed, produced, or stockpiled biological weapons.”98 Regarding 
Egypt’s chemical weapons program, “Egypt was the first country in the Middle East to 
obtain chemical weapons and the first to use them…It is believed to still to have a 
research program and has never reported the destruction of any of its chemical agents or 
weapons.”99   
Egypt’s lack of a nuclear weapons program is an interesting case as Egypt’s geo-
political standing seems to have many of the elements that would lead a country to pursue 
such a program. Egypt is a member of the NPT and had signed it in 1968 but did not 
ratify until 1981. Egypt’s evident precursors that could lead a state to pursue a nuclear 
weapons program are, “It has fought several wars and only enjoyed a ‘cold peace’ with a 
next-door neighbor that possesses both nuclear weapons and a significant edge in 
conventional weapons…it was one of the first countries to embark on a civil nuclear 
program…Its military has played a powerful, even dominant, role in its political 
system…heir to a great civilization…[and] It has regarded its nuclear asymmetry with 
Israel as intolerable and made elimination of that symmetry a persistent, highly 
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publicized objective of its diplomacy.”100 Despite the fact that a nuclear weapons 
program would increase Egypt’s security and increase their prestige in the Arab world, 
Egypt, “does not presently appear to be pursuing nuclear weapons…”101    
     It is valuable to seek the answer to why Egypt has not decided to pursue the nuclear 
option and to try to determine what events would push Egypt to taking the nuclear leap, 
while determining how the role of the nuclear power Israel factors into the equation. It 
appears that each of Egypt’s leaders since the 1960s concluded, “that it would be neither 
necessary nor desirable to do so [develop a nuclear weapon capability] based on three 
considerations: the magnitude of the technical and economic challenges involved in the 
development of such a program, Israel’s counter-proliferation campaign against it, and 
most important, U.S. diplomatic initiatives toward Egypt employing both carrots 
(including, apparently, reassurances to Egypt that ‘Israel will not introduce’ nuclear 
weapons into the Middle East) and sticks.”102 Egypt concluded that the benefits of 
pursuing a nuclear weapons program did not outweigh the costs of such a program. 
As for attempts in the 1960s to develop a program, Egypt was unable to get states 
to sell them nuclear weapons and after the 1967 war, the Egyptian economy was in too 
poor a state to spend money on a nuclear program, so all nuclear programs were halted 
and the priorities were focused on improving conventional forces in order to regain 
territory lost in the 1967 war.103  Despite some believing Egypt to be technically capable 
to develop a nuclear weapons program, Egypt lacks the necessary money, ambition, and 
has steadfastly held to its strong advocacy of a “nuclear-weapon-free” Middle East.104  
Nonetheless, Egypt has not closed the door altogether as Mubarak hedges, “We do not 
think now of entering the nuclear club because we do not want war.  We are not in a 
hurry.  We have a nuclear reactor at Inshas, and we have very capable experts. If the time 
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comes when we need nuclear weapons, we will not hesitate.”105 Egypt could not afford a 
nuclear weapons program and instead chose to play a moral leadership role renouncing 
nuclear weapons in the Middle East, thus targeting Israel’s de facto program 
diplomatically — and maintaining a higher ground, forgoing nuclear proliferation. 
When assessing the effect of Israel on a regional state’s interest in pursuing 
WMD, it is necessary to determine what the state has, when they developed it, and why. 
For Egypt, they developed chemical weapons in the 1960s after the Israeli nuclear facility 
at Dimona was announced, but also at a time when there were no norms established 
against the development of such weapons. Egypt’s pursuit of both biological and 
chemical weapons was also due in part to Nasser’s vision of becoming the Arab leader.  
Despite Egypt having chemical and biological weapons, it has currently forgone a pursuit 
a nuclear weapons program. As Egypt obtained biological and chemical weapons for 
multiple reasons and has forgone nuclear proliferation, Israel’s role in Egypt’s 
proliferation has had a negligible impact on the U.S. national interest of nonproliferation 
of WMD in the Middle East.   
H. NONPROLIFERATION CONCLUSION 
The United States’ “special relationship” with Israel and Israel’s de facto nuclear 
weapons program can be assessed as having an overall negligible effect on the 
proliferation of WMD in the Middle East. Despite, Syria’s chemical weapons program 
having direct ties to its conflict with Israel and having been pursued to deter Israel, the 
program has existed for sometime and Syria has not been driven to pursue a nuclear 
weapons program. Egypt also is not regarded as pursuing a nuclear weapons capability 
and its chemical weapons are traced to the 1960s and Nasser’s drive to lead Arab 
nationalism as much as it was to protect against its nemesis, Israel. More recently, Egypt 
has expressed a desire for nuclear power partly in response to Shiite Iran’s nuclear 
program, but some experts believe such an outlook provides a cover for Egypt to 
proliferate, while its real threat is Israel. While Israel may not have territorial aspirations 
of Egyptian land, Egypt, like most states, would like military parity with its neighbor. 
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Finally, one of the more threatening global concerns, Iran’s nuclear weapons program, 
can be portrayed as being driven by its threat from the United States, its desire for power 
and prestige, and its desire to be a regional power to ensure its own national interests vice 
being prompted by a threat perceived by Israel’s WMD arsenal.  Iran believes the 
pressure on it to halt its nuclear program is unfair and that there is some hypocrisy in the 
nonproliferation regime. Nonetheless, the net direct effect of the U.S. relationship with 
Israel and Israel’s de facto nuclear weapons program can be assessed as negligible on 
proliferation of WMD in the Middle East. This conclusion does not mean that there are 
no other negative effects of the U.S.–Israeli relationship for many countries believe there 
is a double standard regarding when the U.S. chooses to enforce nonproliferation and 
when it does not (Israel, Pakistan, India), which can decrease U.S. leverage and possibly 
lower the amount of support it gets from other countries.  
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III. SPREADING DEMOCRACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on the U.S. objective of spreading democracy in the Middle 
East and will assess how it is affected by the U.S.–Israeli relationship. The chapter will 
begin by providing lessons as to why authoritarianism in the Middle East remains 
prevalent in an era of democratization. The chapter will then conduct case studies of 
authoritarianism in Iran, Syria, and Egypt.  Each case study will begin with a description 
of the government’s structure that allows for the authoritarianism.  Each case study will 
include an analysis of the current regime’s repression, manipulation of elections, and any 
political liberalization movements. Each case study will also assess the impact of the 
U.S.–Israeli relationship on democratization in the state. Only in the case study of Syria 
does the section conclude that the relationship between the U.S. and Israel has negative 
connotations for the prospects of political liberalization. The chapter concludes that 
although the U.S. is partly responsible for the longevity of authoritarianism in the region, 
the U.S.–Israeli relationship, overall, negligibly affects the U.S. national interest of 
spreading democracy in the Middle East. The dominant rationale for Middle East regimes 
to maintain authoritarianism is to retain power — and the perks that go with it.  
B. AUTHORITARIANISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
An overview of reasons authoritarianism in the Middle East is believed to be well 
rooted is useful in providing insight as to where its strength is derived.  This section will 
discuss the center of gravity of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and discuss the 
four primary reasons that they are able to endure in an age of democratization.  While 
elections are certainly an important characteristic in democracies, even elections in the 
Middle East, which lack the transparency known in Western elections, can further the 
cause of political reform.  There is often discussion of the importance of civil society in 
furthering democracy, but some scholars have questioned its usefulness in the Middle 
East.  The section concludes with some useful prerequisites necessary for a state to make 
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a successful transition to democracy. This section furthers the understanding of 
authoritarianism and the challenges of political liberalization in the Middle East that will 
allow a greater perspective leading into the case studies of Iran, Syria, and Egypt.   
The study of political reform and democratization in the Middle East is complex, 
but can provide reasons why authoritarianism remains robust in the region. 
Authoritarianism has endured in the Middle East for four reasons: the fiscal health 
(“rents”) of the regimes, international support, patrimonial security organizations, and 
low levels of popular mobilization.  Among the four listed reasons for the longevity of 
authoritarianism in the Middle East, the strong security apparatuses of the state are the 
greatest factor, and their strength is in part due to the other three factors.  Bellin’s 
argument is, “authoritarianism has proven exceptionally robust in the MENA region 
because the coercive apparatus in many MENA states has proven exceptionally able and 
willing to crush reform initiatives from below.”106  She further concludes, “…while the 
removal of democracy suppressing coercive apparatuses is a necessary condition for 
democratic transition and consolidation, it is not sufficient.”107   
One lesson regarding political liberalization is, “Any notion of a single 
prerequisite of democracy should be jettisoned.”108  A host of conditions including a 
minimal level of elite commitment, a minimal level of national solidarity, a minimum 
level of per capita GNP, and perhaps most important of all, the creation of impartial and 
effective state institutions must be present.109 Without such, Bellin states, the result of 
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kind of authoritarianism or even chaos — one has to think of Iraq today as a good 
example of her forecast.110 Another oft promoted means to reform is via a strong civil 
society. 
Studies of civil society in the Middle East have questioned civil society’s ability 
to liberalize political systems. Langohr surmises that, “it is time for scholarly and policy 
analysis of democratization in the region to focus less on the role of NGOs and more on 
the importance of developing viable political parties.”111  Bellin also suggests that civil 
society is not a satisfying explanation for authoritarianism as it is “weak and thus proves 
to be an ineffective champion of democracy.”112 Hope remains for political reform in the 
Middle East nonetheless because the region does have elections, which better than civil 
society can further democratization’s cause.   
While elections take place in the MENA states, Posusney surmises, “Multiple 
legislative elections have been initiated by authoritarian Arab rulers not as a step toward 
making these changes [toward democracy] but as a means to forestall them.”113   One 
hindrance to elections achieving political liberalization is that electoral engineering and 
election fraud pose formidable obstacles to democratization and can prevent the citizenry 
from pushing for greater participation.114  Posusney observes that if incumbent 
executives feel threatened by legislative elections, they will “alter the rules of the game,” 
as in the cases of Jordan and Egypt.115  Nonetheless, a lesson from elections in the 
MENA region is that elections do offer hope for political liberalization, because “holding 
contested elections foregrounds the principle that citizens have a right to self-selected 
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political representation… [As] Posusney predicts such activities will increase, and the 
result should be that blatant electoral fraud will be harder to pull off as time goes by.”116  
The case studies on Iran, Syria, and Egypt will reveal the nature of 
authoritarianism in these three states. While the will to retain power will be evident in 
each case, there will be cause for hope in the reform process, at least in light that each 
state does in fact have elections. Nonetheless, it will not hold that the U.S.–Israeli 
relationship is an impediment to political reform or a cause of authoritarianism’s 
longevity in the Middle East. The U.S.–Israeli relationship negligibly affects the U.S. 
interest of spreading democracy in the Middle East.   
C. IRAN AND DEMOCRACY 
1. Introduction 
While the Iranian Revolution may have been partially motivated by anti-U.S. and 
Israeli sentiment, the U.S.–Israeli relationship has an overall negligible effect on the lack 
of democratization in Iran. The structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran ensures the 
Islamic character of the regime and Iranian life, and seeks to maintain the principles of 
the Islamic Revolution. The supreme leaders in Iran control the key elements of Iranian 
power to the extent that the regime can counter any internal threats before they endanger 
the regime. Iran implements repressive tactics to combat opponents it deems a threat or 
decides to make examples of. Despite many examples of fair elections in Iran, there have 
been significant examples of the regime’s intervention that have hampered efforts of 
political reformists. Although political reformers have held the presidency and the 
majority in the parliament, they still lacked the power to make substantive change in Iran. 
Such limited authority to create change has led many Iranians to denounce reformists for 
their lack of progress. There is seemingly little correlation between Iran’s continued 
Islamic regime and the U.S.–Israeli relationship that would suggest that the relationship 
hampers democratic progress in Iran. 
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2. Iranian Government Structure and the Islamic Regime 
Iran is an Islamic republic that lacks some key elements of democratic 
governments. The structure of the Iranian government provides the power in the hands of 
its hard-liner religious clerics who ensure the Islamic nature of Iran. The State 
Department notes, “The December 1979 Iranian constitution defines the political, 
economic, and social order of the Islamic republic…[and]…stipulates that the Assembly 
of Experts, which currently exists of eighty-six popularly-elected clerics chooses the 
Supreme Leader based on jurisprudent qualifications and commitment to the principles of 
the revolution.”117 Keshavarzian describes the Iranian government as “a regime that 
subsumes principles of republicanism and mass participation into a particular 
interpretation of Islam privileging clerical rule and limiting the scope of politics.”118  
The most powerful element in the Iranian government is the supreme leader, who 
is ensured control of the government by a base of conservative ayatollahs.  The supreme 
leader is the guide of the revolution and has been held by only Khomeini and his 
successor, Khamenei.  As Shadid notes, “The guide, a position for life, can dismiss the 
president, acts as commander-in-chief and appoints the heads of the media, revolutionary 
guards, military, and the judiciary, all among the most important institutions within the 
government.”119 As will be elaborated on in the political reform part of this section, the 
structure of the government has enabled the clerical leaders to block political reform by a 
popularly elected president and parliament (Majlis).  
Beyond the ability to dismiss the president, the Supreme Leader also maintains a 
degree of additional control through the Council of Guardians. The Council of Guardians 
has the authority to veto any law and is responsible to ensure all laws conform to not only 
the constitution but Islamic principles. The Council of Guardians is also charged with 
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approving candidates for the presidency, local government seats, the Assembly of 
Experts, and the parliament. As the Council of Guardians is a 12 member body with six 
members appointed directly by the supreme leader and the other six by the Majlis, it has 
not proven to be enough of a safety net for the conservative clerics. 
Ayatollah Khomeini created the Council for Expediency in 1988 for even greater 
control. The expediency body was established to resolve legislative disputes between the 
Majlis and the Council of Guardians and places further control in the supreme leader’s 
grips as it is composed of “the heads of the three branches of government, the clerical 
members of the Council of Guardians, and members appointed by the Supreme Leader 
for three years.”120 Katzman concludes that the Iranian regime created by Ayatollah 
Khomeini, “appears relatively stable, despite internal schism, occasional unrest in areas 
inhabited by minorities, and substantial unpopularity among intellectuals, students, 
educated elites, and many women.”121 The structure of the Iranian regime does not allow 
for political reform. Although created to maintain Islamic revolutionary principles, one of 
which is the return of Palestinians to their former homeland, neither Israel nor its 
relationship with the U.S., are factors affecting the Iranian government’s structure. 
3. Political Repression, Elections, and Political Reform in Iran 
The Iranian regime uses political repression, manipulates elections by screening 
candidates, and limits political reform that could alter control of the supreme leader and 
its founding Islamic principles, thus stifling attempts to instill democratic reform. The 
Country Report on Human Rights Practices – 2005 for Iran concludes that numerous 
violations of rights took place that year such as restriction on the right of citizens to 
change their government, summary executions, disappearances, torture, violence by 
groups tied to the regime, arbitrary arrests, and restrictions on civil liberties.122 The State 
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Department notes, “There has been some moderation of excesses since the early days of 
the revolution, and the country experienced a partial ‘thaw’ in terms of political and 
social freedoms during the tenure of former president Khatami, but serious problems 
remain.”123 However, there are still reported political killings conducted by regime 
authorities. As the Country Report on Human Rights Practices – 2005 for Iran further 
states, “The government was responsible for numerous killings during the year, including 
executions following trials that lacked due process. Exiles and human rights monitors 
alleged that many of those supposedly executed for criminal offenses, such as narcotics 
trafficking, actually were political dissident.”124 The report further cites the severely 
restricted freedoms of press and speech, which have been further limited since President 
Ahmadinejad was elected. While political repression exists in Iran, it does not exist due 
to the existence of Israel nor its relationship with the U.S. 
The Iranian electoral system is structured to prevent political liberalization and is 
manipulated to ensure the conservative Islamic clerics maintain their hold over the values 
and power of the country. As Keshavarzian states, “…legal and administrative 
impediments to free and fair public participation in politics are reinforced by the use of 
targeted violence and indiscriminate intimidation by multilayered law enforcement 
apparatus and vigilante squads seeking to control and monitor many dimensions of public 
and private life.”125 The political repression in Iran exists to maintain conservative 
Islamic values and political power in the hands of the hard line clerics. 
Iran has a robust electoral system that has popularly elected government officials; 
however, the structure of the system is easily manipulated to limit reformist success. 
Once candidates are approved to be on Iranian ballots, elections in Iran are often fair. The 
manipulation occurs with the selection of candidates. Keshavarzian captures the 
discontent of Iranians: “dissatisfaction with the political, social, and economic status quo 
abounds…[it] is clear that the majority of Iranians want significant changes necessitating 
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a refashioning of the political relations.”126 After a strong showing in the 2000 Majlis 
elections for political reformers, hardliners regained the majority in 2004 when “the 
Council of Guardians disqualified 3,600 mostly reformist candidates, including 87 
members of the current Majles, enabling the conservatives to win a majority (about 155 
out of the 290 seats) on a turnout of about 51%.”127 The Country Report on Human 
Rights Practices – 2005 on Iran also reported candidate manipulation in the presidential 
election of Ahmadinejad, citing that the June election was “widely viewed as neither free 
not fair.”128 Due to the lack of transparency in candidate selections, “elections have been 
a means for citizens to either punish the establishment by voting incumbents out of office 
or expressing displeasure by not voting and implicitly bringing the populist platform of 
the regime under question.”129 Despite genuinely fair elections, the conservative clerics 
in Iran manipulate the election system through the selection of candidates onto ballots. 
Such manipulation alters what would be the popular choice of many Iranians and limits 
the success of political reformists. 
Political reformists in Iran have made little progress advancing political 
liberalization. As Takeyh notes, “Iran is a case study of how a cynical judiciary working 
in conjunction with the unelected branches of government can effectively undermine a 
progressive [and elected president and parliamentary] regime and its reformist 
agenda.”130 Another issue hampering reform is the timidity of elected reformists.  As 
Kashavazrian states, “Both theorists and soft-liners, including President Khatami, have 
often been wary of encouraging social mobilization and have preferred a more ‘moderate’ 
tactic of confronting hard-liners.”131 Political reformists missed their opportunity, for, 
“With the electoral debacle in the 2004 parliamentary elections, even the leaders of the 
reformist movement have acknowledged that their movement has been unsuccessful and 
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defeated.”132 The state structure in Iran allows for little control by elected officials to 
implement desired policies over the bureaucracy and the executive powers.133 Despite the 
presence of reformists in Iran, it is important to note that they do not necessarily want to 
overthrow the regime, but they did want “to be more democratic, to reconsider its 
relationship to religion, to provide security and adhere to the law and to choose an order 
born of a stable democracy instead of an unsettled revolution.”134 The prospects for 
political liberalization in Iran are not positive. However, it does not follow that the 
government’s desire to repel reform efforts nor the lack of reformists’ success in Iran is 
related to the existence of Israel or its relationship with the U.S. 
4. The Effect of the U.S.–Israeli Relationship on the Lack of 
Democratization in Iran 
While there is much on the negative relations between Iran and the West, to 
include Israel, there is a paucity of evidence that the U.S.–Israeli relationship affects the 
lack of political reform in Iran. Nonetheless, Iran has been steadfastly anti-American and 
anti-Israeli from the beginning of the Iranian Revolution. As Telhami states, “Even 
though Iran is a non-Arab Shiite Muslim state, its spiritual leader, the Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini, highlighted the spiritual importance of Jerusalem, and one of his first acts was 
to close the Israeli embassy and open one for the Palestine Liberation Organization.”135 
Indeed as Keddie noted, Khomeini long criticized the shah before the revolution for his 
association with the United States as it was an enemy of Islam partially due to the U.S. 
support of Israel, and three top critical complaints for Khomeini were “dictatorship, 
subservience to the United States, and good relations with Israel.”136 The Iranian 
Revolution was popular throughout the Middle East after the failure of Arab regimes to 
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dispel Israel. Muslims believed the Iranian revolution signaled what would become an 
eventuality elsewhere so that, “No longer would the Islamic world have to kowtow to the 
West and accept the inevitability of Israel.”137 As Lesch further notes, the Iranian 
Revolution did lead to Islamist dissent becoming mainstream and building up its support 
throughout the Middle East.138 While there is evidence that the U.S.–Israeli relationship 
was one rationale for the overthrow of the shah, it does not follow that the U.S.–Israeli 
relationship currently prevents democracy from taking root in Iran.  Therefore, the U.S.–
Israeli relationship negligibly affects the promotion of democracy in the case of Iran.      
D. SYRIA AND DEMOCRACY 
1. Introduction 
The impact of the U.S.–Israeli relationship has a slightly negative effect on 
Syria’s prospects for political liberalization. In order to retain its hold on power, the Asad 
regime in Syria is not likely to introduce meaningful political reform. As Friedman notes 
of Hafez al-Asad’s regime, “Asad was a brutal realist with a very limited agenda – 
survival.”139 The structure of the Syrian government ensures the Ba’ath party rules the 
country. Neither Hafez al-Asad nor his replacement, his son, Bashar al-Asad, has shown 
a propensity to institute political reform in Syria that would allow a representative form 
of government.  Such lack of reform is due to the desire to retain power.  The Asad 
regime has denied the presence of both a meaningful opposition and meaningful 
elections.  The regime uses repression to both intimidate and weaken opposition.  As with 
authoritarianism elsewhere in the Middle East, the Asad regime remains in power not due 
to widespread support and legitimacy but through the security apparatus of the state.  
Bashar al-Asad (and his father before him) has received support for his foreign policy  
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regarding anti-Western rhetoric and the Israeli–Arab conflict.  Nonetheless, this section 
will argue the U.S.–Israeli relationship has a negative effect on political liberalization in 
Syria. 
2. Syria’s Government Structure and Asad Regime 
Although Syria is termed a republic, under the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party, it is in 
practice an authoritarian regime.  The United States State Department describes Syria this 
way: “Officially, Syria is a republic.  In reality, however, it is an authoritarian regime that 
exhibits only the forms of a democratic system.”140  Under Hafez al-Asad, Syria 
instituted a constitution in 1973 that included a parliament.  However, the parliament, the 
People’s Council, was not provided with real power as the constitution provided the 
executive with outright control of the government.  The State Department goes on to 
describe the authority of the Syrian president as having, “the right to appoint ministers, to 
declare war and states of emergency, to issue laws (which, except in the case of 
emergency, require ratification by the People’s Council), to declare amnesty, to amend 
the constitution, and to appoint civil servants and military personnel.”141  The People’s 
Council is described as not having any independent authority in that while members of 
parliament “may criticize policies and modify draft laws, they cannot initiate laws, and 
the executive branch retains ultimate control over the legislative process.”142  Pluralism is 
lacking in the parliament as well for of the 250 seats, only 83 are eligible for non-
Ba’athist party members.  Cleveland depicts al-Asad the elder as having consolidated his 
authority via both the military and the Ba’athist party that enabled his rise to the 
presidency, noting, “He himself took the office of secretary general of the Ba’th, thus 
combining the two roles of head of state and head of party.”143  Batatu also describes the 
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elder al-Asad’s hold over the levers of power to include security, intelligence, the 
military, and foreign affairs to an extent where his authority is undisputed.144  The 
structure of the government was intended to protect the incumbent regime and was not 
influenced by the U.S.–Israeli relationship. 
While Hafez al-Asad came to power with seemingly good intentions to serve the 
Syrians, he had no intention of allowing representative governance or of turning over 
power.  The modest background of the Asad family and his rise was a victory for rural 
Syrians and his minority Alawi Muslim sect.  Hafez al-Asad’s regime “had a decidedly 
rural composition and represented the rise of the countryside at the expense of the former 
elite class of urban-based notable families…(and his officials were)… pragmatic officers 
and administrators whose goals were focused on the needs of their country in its Middle 
Eastern context and on keeping power that had finally come their way.”145  Hafez al-
Asad rhetorically emphasized the importance of the voice of the people.  As Batatu 
quotes him, “…he referred to the people as ‘the source of every authority.’  One element, 
he went on, ‘must invariably inhere in all [the political and syndicalist] institutions: the 
free choice and the free desire of the masses of the people.’”146  However, Hafez al-Asad 
believed that the masses were only concerned with certain economic things such as 
having a car, a house, and a little land that his regime could satisfy - but, “Only ‘one or 
two hundred individuals at most,’ he added, seriously engage in or make politics their 
profession and will oppose him no matter what he does.  ‘It is for them,’ he concluded 
‘that the Mezzeh prison was originally intended.’”147 After initial hope and some political 
reforms under Asad the younger, Syrians and the world learned that things would not 
change in Syria under Bashar. 
Hopes of political reform in the “Damascus Spring” with Bashar al-Asad’s regime 
quickly faded and it is clear that the regime will remain authoritarian. The State 
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Department notes, “little has changed since Bashar al-Asad succeeded his father.”148 
Many believe that the benefactors of the al-Asad regime seek to maintain the status quo 
so that they can continue to receive the benefits of being regime insiders. It was the 
regime supporters in the Parliament that took the steps to ensure the status quo.  After 
Hafez’s death, “the Parliament amended the constitution, reducing the mandatory 
minimum age of the President fron 40 to 34 years old, which allowed his son, Bashar Al-
Asad legally to be eligible for nomination by the ruling Ba’ath party. On July 10, 2000, 
Bashar Al-Asad legally became President by referendum in which he ran unopposed, 
garnering 97.29% of the vote, according to Syrian government statistics.”149 Bashar al-
Asad, despite initial hopes, is not leading his country in the direction of political 
liberalization. 
3 Political Repression, Elections, and Political Reform in Syria 
The Bashar al-Asad regime maintains a high level of repression commensurate 
with the most repressive authoritarian regimes. The U.S. State Department’s report on 
human rights outlines lengthy violations of Bashar al-Asad’s regime in a number of areas 
to include absence of the right to change government, arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of 
life, torture in prison, arbitrary arrests and detentions, and the absence of rule of law to 
name a few of the human rights violations conducted by the Syrian regime.150 The report 
also cites that four people were killed in 2005 in Syrian detention facilities due to torture 
or mistreatment and despite torture being illegal in Syria law, the torture of prisoners in 
Syria by Syrian security officials is common. The report further accounts numerous 
instances of political repression such as arrests of returning political exiles after promises 
of safe return, family members of persons associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, a 
person calling for reform on the Al-Jazeera news network, a person carrying newsletters 
published by an opposition group, numerous suspected Islamist and Kurds, and even a 
French citizen who had accused Syrian officials of torture.  Political repression and rule  
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over Syrians through fear continue to be the backbone of the al-Asad regime, even under 
Bashar’s rule, leaving no doubt that the hoped for political reform will not occur under 
the new regime. 
Elections in Syria do not allow for opposition groups to win a majority of seats in 
the parliament or to elect a new president. Despite the Syrian government highlighting its 
April 2007 elections as evidence of its democracy, there was little enthusiasm in Syria 
and only criticism from the United States and the West. The BBC reported that voters 
have shown little interest in the elections as there is little contest and dissidents are jailed, 
“a sign of little change in Syria since Bashar Asad came to power seven years ago.”151 
The BBC further reported, “Former political prisoners, of which there are many in Syria, 
are stripped of their civil rights and cannot stand in elections or vote, and the rules make 
it impossible for any real independents to win.”152 Even in Syria, the opposition 
emphasized the lack of election transparency and condemned the election as a farce and 
urged a boycott.153 
Little will change with the July 2007 referendum for the presidency.  For decades, 
only Hafez al-Asad and now his son Bashar have been allowed to be on the referendum 
for Syria’s presidency. After Hafez’s death in 2000, Bashar was elected president, 
running in a referendum unopposed. The State Department cites, “The late President 
Hafiz Al-Asad was confirmed by unopposed referenda five times.”154 Bashar is again 
scheduled to run unopposed for the Syrian presidency in July 2007. The al-Asad regime 
in Syria will not allow an opposition to threaten its hold on power. 
Despite recent attempts by opposition groups to create a united front, the groups 
have not been able to translate their unity into political power within Syria. One problem 
confronting all opposition groups is that, as one regime opponent claimed, “the Baath 
                                                 
151  "Syrians Unmoved by Chance to Vote," BBC News (2007)  (accessed April 26, 2007). 
152  Ibid. 
153  Ibid. 
154  United States. Department of State, Background Note: Syria. 
 51
party has infiltrated all internal opposition groups.”155 The United State Institute of Peace 
notes, “The Muslim Brotherhood has emerged as the most powerful opposition force, 
inside and outside the country. It is evolving and beginning to forge important links with 
secular opposition groups.”156 The USIP briefing further notes that the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Syria no longer calls for an Islamic state. In late October 2005, a leap in 
unity of opposition groups took place with the Damascus Declaration.  
The Damascus Declaration consisted of opponents to the regime across the 
political spectrum, who agreed to principles for change in Syria based on democracy, 
nonviolence, and oppositional unity. Many intellectuals and associations announced 
support for the declaration. As Landis and Pace wrote, “For the first time in Syrian 
history, an assemblage of bickering parties and scattered intellectuals representing 
Kurdish nationalists, Arab nationalists, Socialists, Communists, liberals, and Islamists 
[all] united under a single platform, for democratic change.”157 Another development 
escalated the strength of oppositional forces with the defection the former vice president 
Khaddam from the al-Asad regime in December 2005, as he spoke out against the regime 
on Al-Arabiya.  Khaddam’s defection and formation of the National Salvation Front 
(NSF) was believed to be a greater blow to the regime than the Damascus Declaration, as 
“Khaddam possesses a personal fortune, a wealth of important connections, and an 
intimate knowledge of the inner workings of a notoriously opaque regime.”158 The 
regime responded to the new found unity amongst its opponents by outlawing contact 
with expatriate dissidents and banning opponents from traveling abroad.  
After another declaration of opponents alongside Lebanese intellectuals in May 
2006, the regime cracked down on opponents arresting many of the signers of the Beirut-
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Damascus Declaration, two of whom were never released.159 The regime was able to 
effectively suppress its opponents from posing a strong challenge to its authority. The al-
Asad regime had a boost to its popularity and released many of the oppositional prisoners 
after the summer of 2006 when the regime and Hizbollah were able to point to success 
against Israel during the summer conflict. While there are oppositional movements in 
Syria, the regime does not allow them to gain enough momentum to be a formidable 
challenge.  
Despite political liberalization’s appeal to most Syrians, the al-Asad regime does 
not implement political reforms that would jeopardize Ba’ath rule. Hirst notes that while 
many Syrians may resent the United States, they may even dislike their Syrian 
government more so and would prefer freedom and democracy.160 However as Rabil 
states of al-Asad the younger, “Bashar is no Mikail Gorbachev; he is not eager to 
introduce the Syrian equivalent of perestroika or glasnost, which could unseat him from 
power. In fact, he clamped down on the reform movement that he himself helped launch 
once he realized its ramifications for the political system.”161 Rabil further asserts that 
under Bashar, “the political system has undergone no significant institutional change.”162  
Lasensky, Yacoubian, and Jouejati believe the necessary political will of elites to 
push for political reform is absent.163 It is further believed that the regime has some 
factors that work in its favor and allow greater resiliency to reform.  These include: the 
chaos in Iraq and Syrians not wanting the same fate, humiliation at the hands of Lebanese 
criticism of Syria’s role in Lebanon, and the fact that Bashar al-Asad is seen to be 
standing up to the U.S., which is seen by Syrians as anti-Syrian and not even handed with 
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respect to its relations in the Middle East favoring Israel.164 Bashar al-Asad and his team 
of ruling Alawi elites have not implemented political reform in Syria. 
4. The Effect of U.S.–Israeli Relationship on the Lack of 
Democratization in Syria 
The U.S.–Israeli relationship and the Israel-Arab conflict in general have a 
slightly negative effect on the U.S. national interest of promoting democracy in the 
Syrian case.  While Syrians and the Syrian regime are anti-Israel and increasingly anti-
American, they appear more united on issues of foreign policy. Although not the sole 
reason, the conflict with Israel is one of the rationalizations the al-Asad regime uses to 
legitimize the Emergency Law in place in Syria since 1963. The relationship between the 
U.S. and Israel has led to greater anti-Americanism within Syria. Any liberal opponents 
to the regime are weakened by the strong U.S.–Israeli relationship to a degree that if 
liberal opponents of the regime received aid from the West in its pursuit for democracy, 
they would be de-legitimized for collaborating with Syria’s enemies. Because liberal-
democratic minded opposition cannot receive help from the West in liberalizing Syria, 
U.S. interests in promoting democracy in the Middle East, in the case of Syria, are 
negatively affected by its relationship with Israel.  
Foreign policy is an area where the Syrian populace and the al-Asad regime have 
generally the same positions. For the al-Asad regime, Israel is seen as a threat, for in 
Hafez’s view,  
Israel was an expansionist state whose ambitions were underwritten by the 
United States. He believed that is was Syria’s duty to resist the Israeli 
threat and to work in the cause of Arab unity. Al-Asad’s concern with 
Israel reflected the opinion of most Syrians, who felt the territory that 
eventually became the Palestine mandate was regarded as a part of 
Southern Syria, and its transformation into the state of Israel stirred strong 
emotions among Syrians.165  
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Hafez’s goal to dominate through military force and the intimidation of Lebanon, 
Jordan, and the PLO in an attempt to prevent them from making peace with Israel was 
popular in Syria and helped Hafez to consolidate his power during his early years of 
rule.166 Bashar has followed a similar course and is believed to have supported Hezbollah 
during the 2006 conflict with Israel, to “forestall any move by the small Lebanese army 
to replace Hezbollah units near the Israeli-Lebanese border, thus helping ensure that 
Lebanon will be unable to make an independent peace with Israel without Syrian 
participation.”167 Playing to national sentiment of standing up against the U.S. and Israel, 
Bashar has “derided U.S. claims of creating a new Middle East and warned that ‘future 
generations in the Arab world will find a way to defeat Israel.’”168 The al-Asad regime’s 
foreign policy in relation to Israel and the U.S. has domestic support in Syria that 
emboldens the regime. 
One tool the Al-Asad regime uses to repress opposition groups is the Emergency 
Law that has been in effect since 1963 due to Syria’s conflict with Israel. Such stringent 
laws allow the regime’s security apparatuses to oppress opposition groups before they 
can become threats to the regime. Although the laws were originally intended to allow 
the regime to combat the threat from Israel, they are used against all threats to the regime 
including Islamist movements. Syria’s state of emergency and continued martial law was 
justified by the Asad regime with the claim that Syria and Israel were in a state of war.169 
Despite this questionable rationale, the Emergency Laws have been a tool that has 
allowed the Asad regime to maintain power and repress political opponents. The 
relationship between the U.S. and Israel helped lead to the Syrian Emergency Law and 
helped embolden the authoritarian Alawi regime. 
The U.S.–Israeli relationship has increased anti-Americanism in Syria, which 
reduces U.S. ability to influence and empower liberal regime opponents. The U.S. focus 
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on changing Syria’s foreign policy has made it difficult for opposition groups to support 
the U.S. and therefore receive funds to enable an effective opposition. Syrians want 
democracy but like their regime’s foreign policy.  As Landis writes, “Washington’s 
demands that Syria stop supporting Hamas and other Palestinian organizations, while it 
remains silent in the face of Israeli expropriation of Palestinian land, places the Syrian 
opposition in an impossible position vis-à-vis the United States.”170 Landis further writes 
that opposition groups who do have a favorable view of the U.S. were shaken by the 2006 
conflict between Hezbollah and Israel as Hezbollah gained heightened support from its 
success, and al-Asad accused some opposition “of tacitly supporting Israel and opposing 
the ‘Arab position.’”171 Because of the U.S.–Israeli relationship, the pro-democracy 
opposition in Syria is weakened and the al-Asad’s regime gains support for his defiance 
of the U.S. and his policy against Israel. The U.S. national interest of promoting 
democracy in the Middle East is weakened by its relationship with Israel when assessed 
by the Syria case study.        
E. EGYPT AND DEMOCRACY 
1. Introduction 
The democracy promotion case study of Egypt will be confined to the Mubarak 
era.  I will present a description of the Egyptian government in context with its current 
regime and the form of government in Egypt.  I will seek to establish whether or not 
Egypt, specifically the Mubarak regime, is genuinely seeking democratic reform.  To do 
so, I will assess Egypt’s government reforms and the actions and statements of regime 
officials and agencies to determine the direction of Egypt’s government.  After an 
assessment of the Egyptian government’s structure and the Mubarak regime, I will then 
assess whether Israel is deemed a threat by the Mubarak regime and the Egyptian people, 
thereby providing a rationale for Mubarak to legitimize its authoritarian nature,  
continue repression, and delay political liberalization.  The section will conclude  
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that Egypt is not on the road to political liberalization and the effect of Israel on  
Egypt’s lack of democratization is negligible.    
2. Egyptian Government Structure and the Mubarak Regime 
While the Egyptian government is classified as a republic, one must take a closer 
look to determine its true nature.172  Egypt’s constitution dates back to 1971 and the 
constitution has since had a number of amendments.  President Mubarak’s authority 
derives from his position as the executive and his political party, the National Democratic 
Party, has dominated the government since 1978.  While the Egyptian constitution 
guarantees an independent judiciary, Mubarak’s party continues to hold sway over courts 
and most judges.  The judiciary is in fact far from independent as evidenced by the state 
having removed two of Egypt’s top judges, “who were stripped of their judicial immunity 
and detained after publicly charging electoral fraud during parliamentary elections late 
last year.”173  Goldschmidt explains that the Egyptian judiciary has had some success at 
independence, for it has “criticized and at times nullified the acts of Mubarak’s 
administration and even supervised the 2000 elections, but it remains vulnerable to 
pressure from the executive – especially the justice and interior ministries.”174  The 
legislative branch consists of the People’s Assembly, which is popularly elected and also 
the partially elected consultative council called the Shura Council.  However as 
Goldschmidt further explains, the People’s Assembly has not had a role in foreign and 
defense issues, and “Mubarak is far more likely to initiate new laws than the 
parliamentarians, and even their committees are little more than sounding boards for the 
ministers.”175 A close look at the Egyptian regime reveals its lack of republican 
attributes. 
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3. Political Repression, Elections, and Political Reform in Egypt 
Mubarak’s leadership has been described as being at times “downright 
dictatorial,” and censorship and repression are regular occurrences under his regime.  
Huband concludes that the Mubarak regime, while being “…more open than its 
predecessors, remains reliant upon the military and security apparatus, has no substantial 
ideological credibility, and has no proven popular appeal.”176  The regime uses Egyptian 
emergency laws and has “…banned certain newspapers and magazines, placed its foes 
under house arrest or preventive detention without charges or trial, tortured suspects in 
police stations and prisons broken up meetings, and restricted political rallies and 
demonstrations.”177   
In response to militant Islamists, the Mubarak regime has responded with 
indiscriminate repression, “…aimed at not only the hard-core militants of Jama’a and 
Jihad groups but also their supports, families, and virtually anyone who had a beard with 
a trimmed mustache (a sign of religiosity).”178  The Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices – 2005 describes Mubarak’s government as having a poor human rights record 
with serious abuses occurring in areas such as the rights of citizens to change their 
government, existence of a continuous state of emergency, torture and abuse of prisoners 
and detainees (including deaths in custody), poor conditions in prisons and detention 
centers, arbitrary (sometimes mass) arrests and detention, political prisoners, and 
restrictions on civil liberties—freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and association.179 
Hafez and Wiktorowicz argue that such repression exacerbated the Islamic militancy of 
Jama’a, as “…violent contention was a reaction to predatory state policies that threatened 
the organizational and societal gains of a movement, as well as a defensive reaction 
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against an unpredictable future created by indiscriminate repression.”180 Despite the 
façade of political reform in Egypt, it is evident that the Mubarak regime has no intention 
of liberalizing to the extent of risking loss of a complete hold over the reins of power. 
Egyptians have not had the ability to change the government through elections.  
Multi-party system and contested elections in Egyptian parliamentary elections have been 
associated with violence, low turnouts, vote rigging, and fraud.  There has been election 
manipulation to ensure that the NDP maintains a solid majority in the legislature. Egypt 
has undertaken electoral engineering where the ruling party designs electoral rules to 
ensure the desired outcome for their party.  Posusney identifies Egypt as a case where the 
regime alters election rules when initial results prove damaging to incumbents.181  
Nonetheless prospects sometimes arise, where one can have hopes that reform will take 
place. In 2005, Mubarak won a landslide re-election, when for the first time, there was a 
contested presidential election.  Egyptians have now tasted contested elections and will 
likely push for greater transparency in future parliamentary and presidential elections.  
However, there were several issues regarding the fairness of the election.   
The Mubarak regime, like other MENA authoritarian regimes, has manipulated 
political reform to ensure the continued reign of the ruling party.  The ruling NDP pushed 
an amendment to election rules that excluded candidates from the Muslim Brotherhood.  
The amendment also made it very difficult for candidates to run as independents:  
To be eligible, a candidate not affiliated with a party must obtain 
signatures of at least 65 members of the lower house of Parliament, 25 
members of the upper house and ten municipal council members from at 
least 14 provinces. Given that both houses of Parliament and most local 
councils are dominated by the NDP, establishing eligibility would be 
nearly impossible in practice.  The amended Article 76 may have 
introduced the concept of free and fair elections, opposition forces note, 
but it robbed the concept of all substance.182 
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Further, “The September 2005 multiparty presidential election was marred by accounts of 
voter irregularities and intimidation…[and]…Only Egyptian citizens who registered to 
vote before December 2004 could actually vote, a clever loophole given that Mubarak did 
not reveal his intent to hold the election until the following February.”183 The Egyptian 
government manipulates elections to ensure the continuity of the Mubarak regime.   
Another step to avoid a truly competitive presidential election involved “The most 
serious opposition to Mubarak, Ayman Nour of the secular and reformist Al-Ghad 
“Tomorrow” Party, who was imprisoned just weeks before the February announcement 
and now faces prison time on what appears to be trumped-up charges brought by the 
Mubarak government.”184  Nour, nonetheless, was the second place finisher in the 2005 
multiparty presidential election.185  Mubarak’s rule is said to rival the pharaohs and has 
continued to erode any remnants of Egypt’s liberal parliamentary democracy of the early 
20th century, which has “…become stunted by decades of one-party and one-man 
rule.”186  Mubarak himself claims,  
I had a clear vision of the future of the country that won the confidence of 
the people and their support last year.  I have vision of a modern Egyptian 
society which preserves freedom, elevates the value of citizenship and 
strengthens the role of citizens in the political process, a modern 
developed society that lays the foundations of democracy and supports its 
day to day practice.187   
Despite the clearly apparent manipulations in the electoral process, Mubarak still 
strives to come off as a leader with a mandate from the people as he stated in late 
December 2006.  While Egypt may show a propensity to reform, the road is sure to be 
painfully slow with steps forward and sometimes back. 
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4. The Effect of the U.S.–Israeli Relationship on the Lack of 
Democratization in Egypt 
As the Israeli-Palestinian issue resonates for Egyptians as extensively as it does 
for most Arabs, it is important to assess its role in relation to democracy in Egypt.  A look 
at this conflict is important for several reasons.  Many argue that it was the original defeat 
of Arabs by Israeli forces in 1948 that led to the authoritarianism that dominates the 
MENA today.  As Kazziha states,  
The new state structures which were established in Syria, Iraq, and Egypt 
were diametrically opposed to any liberal or democratic tendencies in 
society, and sought to consolidate the authoritarian rule of army officers 
and their allies.  Ultimately, the Palestine issue provided the new rulers 
with a pretext to exercise full control over society in the name of preparing 
for ‘the battle of destiny.’188 
   
Goldschmidt more recently asserts that Egypt’s Arab identity is reviving in part due to 
resentment against Israel for its repression of Palestinians.189  Such sentiments transcend 
Egypt as a recent Zogby poll of MENA countries including Egypt found that Arabs still 
see the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a greater concern than the touted Sunni-Shia divide, 
as evident by 80% of Arabs stating Israel (and the U.S.) is the biggest threat to their 
security as opposed to Iran, which only 6% of those polled claimed to be the biggest 
threat to Arabs.190  Despite the significant amount of aid the U.S. provides to Egypt, 
which helps provide subsidies for necessities, “Washington insists on a degree of 
supervision far stricter than that imposed on, say, Israel — a stance viewed by Egyptians 
as an insult to their competence.”191  Ryan claims that Egypt plays an important role in 
the region as they are one of the few governments that all the parties can talk to and, 
despite Mubarak’s less than ambitious international goals, he has brought Egypt back into 
the international fold after its isolation from other Arab regimes after Sadat’s peace with 
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Israel.192  Despite a “cold peace” and increasing animosity towards Israel, it is evident 
that it will remain that way for a time as Mubarak has himself stated, “I just can’t afford 
to take us to war.”193  Regardless of Israel’s role in the resultant authoritarianism in the 
MENA, it does not follow that the survival of authoritarianism in Egypt is due to the 
continued “cold peace” between the two nations. 
F. DEMOCRACY CONCLUSION 
This chapter concludes that although there is anti-Israeli rhetoric promulgated for 
each of the states studied, only in the case of Syria does the U.S.–Israeli relationship 
appear to negatively affect political liberalization, while in Iran and Egypt the effect of 
the relationship is nearly negligible. This chapter highlights that the background to the 
lack of democratization in the Middle East is multi-faceted. While the chapter did point 
to each state’s ability to suppress dissent via state security apparatuses, several other 
factors also inhibit political liberalization in the Middle East. Syria was the one case, 
where the conclusion that the U.S.–Israeli relationship negatively affects democratization 
in Syria is due to the strong anti-Americanism and anti-Israeli sentiment in the state. 
Syria is a state in the Middle East where both its populace and its government agree on 
many foreign policy issues. Political reformists and regime opponents in Syria are denied 
the resources of the U.S. in its attempt to wield power from the Syrian government and 
institute reform, thus leading to the negative effect on Syria’s ability to liberalize. While 
anti-U.S. and anti-Israeli rhetoric is also prevalent in Egypt and Iran, the results of such 
only appear to have secondary effects as each regime can use anti-West sentiment to rally 
the population’s support and divert attention from the state’s problems. In the Egypt case 
study, the opposition resents the regime due to the regime’s relations with the U.S. and 
Israel. While the indirect effects of the U.S.–Israeli relationship in Egypt are not studied, 
liberalization in Egypt is challenged because if liberalization would occur, the Islamists 
would threaten the regime. An in-depth study of Iran, Syria, and Egypt’s governments 
                                                 
192  Curtis R. Ryan, "Political Strategies and Regime Survival in Egypt," Journal of Third World 
Studies 18, no. 2 (Fall 2001), 25. 
193  Hammond, Arab Media Coverage of Al-Aqsa Intifada Calls Mubarak Government to Account, 
502. 
 62
reveals the nature of authoritarianism in the Middle East that provides insight as to how 
the U.S.–Israeli relationship affects attempts at political reform. The case studies reveal 
that each regime is most interested in staying in power and uses whatever means or issues 
it can to bolster its legitimacy. While anti-Western sentiment is used by each regime to 
further its own support, only in Syria does the U.S.–Israeli relationship appear to have 
concrete negative connotations for democracy promotion, while having negligible effects 
in Iran and Egypt.   
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IV.  COMBATING TERRORISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
 This chapter will assess the U.S.–Israeli relationship’s effect on combating 
terrorism in the Middle East. Prior to the case studies of Iran, Syria, and Egypt, this 
chapter will present U.S. foreign policy on combating terrorism and examine the enemy 
in the war on terrorism. The chapter will first highlight U.S. foreign policy on terror in 
order to capture the breadth of the terror that the U.S. has chosen to confront. The chapter 
will then discuss the enemy the U.S. faces in its war on terrorism, emphasizing some of 
the differences in terrorist organizations by focusing on two groups: Al Qaeda and 
Hezbollah. This understanding of U.S. policy in combating terrorism provides the 
background for the state case studies, where I identify each state’s relationship to terror, 
its rationale for its position, and then assess how the U.S.–Israeli relationship affects each 
state’s position on terrorism. The chapter concludes that the U.S.–Israeli relationship 
negatively affects the U.S. national interest of combating terrorism in the cases of Iran 
and Syria, while being somewhat negative in the case of Egypt due to its populace’s 
sympathy for al-Qaeda and disdain for U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. 
B.  U.S. FOREIGN POLICY ON COMBATING TERRORISM 
 The U.S. has made the war on terrorism its primary foreign policy focus and has 
cast a large net in the hope of reining in terrorist groups beyond those who attacked the 
U.S. on 9/11. Such overarching goals in the war on terrorism have policy consequences 
that may hamper efforts to combat what should arguably be the main objective in the war 
on terrorism: the defeat of al Qaeda and its ideology. In the aftermath of 9/11, President 
Bush, “vowed to wage war against terrorism, not simply against those who were behind 
assaults on New York City and Washington…he would ‘make no distinction between the 
terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.’”194 While such a large 
net easily translated into a fight against al Qaeda and Afghanistan, such a net was more 
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troublesome in also encompassing Iraq, Syria, and Iran, whose al Qaeda ties were 
questionable. The targeting of regimes beyond those who supported al Qaeda directly 
(like Afghanistan) does not receive overwhelming international support. In the Bush 
Administration, such support was not deemed a prerequisite for the U.S. fight against 
terror — in the president’s words, “Either you are with us, or you are with the 
terrorists.’”195 This policy made it difficult for many regimes to remain wholly 
supportive in the fight against terror as the U.S. sights expanded beyond al Qaeda and 
Afghanistan. 
 However, concern that U.S. policies were emboldening anti-Americanism, and 
hampering the fight against al Qaeda, did not seem compelling to the administration, due 
to its views on terrorism. The National Security Strategy states that terrorism does not 
derive from either poverty, hostility toward U.S. actions in Iraq, Israeli-Palestinian issues, 
or U.S. offensive operations against terrorist groups. Instead, it comes about through 
political alienation, past grievances being blamed on others, conspiracy and 
misinformation, and an ideology justifying murder — most of which can be countered by 
democracy.196 Such an outlook on terror rejects any view of U.S. policy as a root cause 
of terror. Expanding the war on terrorism beyond al Qaeda and Afghanistan provided a 
rationale to invade Iraq (because of WMD and alleged ties with al Qaeda) and to further 
isolate Syria and Iran for their support for anti-Israeli terrorist organizations.  
C.  WAR ON TERRORISM ENEMY 
 While the Bush administration desired to knock out al Qaeda, it also wanted to 
eradicate international terrorist groups on all fronts, linking terrorist groups in general 
with the “axis of evil” and their conspiracy to destroy the U.S.197 However, such lack of 
distinction between different Islamist “terrorist groups” further tangled U.S. policy with 
Israel by isolating the states that directly supported anti-Israel groups, such as Hezbollah 
and Hamas. Jihadi movements are far from monolithic, and al Qaeda differs greatly from 
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most other Islamist militants. As Fawaz Gerges notes, “it is misleading and 
counterproductive to lump all jihadis under the rubric of al Qaeda and its affiliates, 
because they account for only a tiny minority within the jihadist movement…religious 
nationalists — a huge block within the jihadist movement—vehemently rejected al 
Qaeda’s strategy and methods and broke with their transnationalist counterparts for 
good.”198 It is important to recognize the differences between al Qaeda and Hezbollah; 
Hezbollah has received much support from both Iran and Syria — subjects of this thesis.   
 While many Americans are probably aware of the Hezbollah of the 1980s to the 
mid-1990s, most are probably not aware of its transitions over the past decade. Hezbollah 
is not nearly as great a threat to the United States as that posed by al Qaeda. As Paul 
Pillar points out, while still very much anti-American, Hezbollah, “has not directly 
carried out a confirmed terrorist attack against a U.S. target since at least 1996.”199 
Hezbollah references U.S. foreign policy as Satanic and cites the existence of an 
American-Zionist conspiracy to dominate the Middle East.  At the same time, its leader, 
Sheikh Hasan Nasrallah, denounced terrorist attacks against the U.S., including al 
Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks stating, “We reject those methods, and believe they contradict Islam 
and the teachings of the Quran, which do not permit this barbarity.”200 Mohammed 
Ayoob describes the differences amongst Jihadist groups: 
What distinguishes both Hamas and Hezbollah from al-Qaeda and other 
transnationalist organizations that carry our acts of indiscriminate violence 
is that their violent activity is restricted territorially and directed against 
specific targets that they consider obstructing their goals of achieving 
national independence or freeing occupied territory. Despite strong [U.S.] 
support for Israel, Hamas and Hezbollah have desisted from attacking 
American targets during the past two decades…both organizations fall 
well within the logic of the state system…more like the Irish Republican 
Army…than the al-Qaeda network.201 
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Shibley Telhami argues that while combating the tactic of terrorism is the right policy, 
one must differentiate between groups by their objectives — which shifts the debate from 
how they seek to obtain their objectives to what their objectives are.202 This chapter 
argues that perhaps narrowing the enemy to those whose ideology is commensurate with 
that of al Qaeda , and those who attack U.S. targets, would better safeguard the U.S. from 
terrorist attacks. 
 While groups like Hezbollah and Hamas may threaten Israel, transnationalist 
terror groups like al Qaeda should be the main objective in the war on terrorism due to 
their unbending resolve to destroy America and the West. Al Qaeda’s goals are 
unacceptable as it designs to destroy America, and attacks against the U.S. and other 
Western targets will only end when al Qaeda and like minded groups are eliminated or 
America chooses to “abandon the Middle East, convert to Islam, and end the immorality 
and godlessness of its society.”203 Whereas many argue the terror groups of Hamas and 
Hezbollah would whither after an Arab-Israeli peace, al Qaeda would not, thus few argue 
against the need to hunt down and kill al Qaeda. One question this chapter seeks to assess 
is whether expanded efforts to isolate Syria and Iran — for their support of groups 
primarily in conflict with Israel — negatively affects the U.S. war on terrorism. 
D.  COMBATING TERRORISM: IRAN CASE STUDY 
 This case study on Iran will argue that the U.S.–Israeli relationship negatively 
affects our interests of combating terrorism. The U.S. not only classifies Iran as a state 
sponsor of terror, but states that Iran is the most significant sponsor of terror. The case 
study will identify U.S. claims against Iran for supporting terrorism. The case study will 
also present objective information that more fully explains Iran’s support of terror. A 
brief assessment will be conducted to determine why Iran supports terror. The Iran case 
study will conclude with an assessment that the U.S.–Israeli relationship negatively 
affects our interests of combating terrorism in the Middle East. 
                                                 
202  Shibley Telhami, "The Contemporary Middle East: Some Questions, some Answers" In The 
Contemporary Middle East, ed. Karl Yambert (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2006), 269. 
203  National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: 
Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 48 and 51. 
 67
 The U.S. classifies Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism. The United States claims 
that, “Iran remains the most significant state sponsor of terrorism.”204  The State 
Department describes Iran as an impediment in the international efforts to combat terror 
and notes that Iran “backs Hizballah (in Lebanon), Hamas, Palestinian Jihad, and the 
Popular Front for the Liberations of Palestine-General Command, all of which are 
violently opposed to the Arab-Israel peace process.”205 The U.S. proclaims that Iran has 
“maintained a high profile role in encouraging anti-Israeli terrorist activity, rhetorically, 
operationally, and financially.”206 Iran is further described as playing a disruptive role in 
Iraq: 
Iran provided guidance and training to select Iraqi Shia political groups, 
and weapons and training to Shia militant groups to enable anti-Coalition 
attacks…The Iranian Revolutionary Guard was linked to armor-piercing 
explosives that resulted in the deaths of Coalition Force. The 
Revolutionary Guard, along with Lebanese Hizbollah, implemented 
training program for Iraqi militants in the construction and use of 
sophisticated IED technology. These individuals then passed on this 
training to additional militants in Iraq.207 
 
Iran is further characterized as not supporting efforts against al Qaeda: 
Iran remained unwilling to bring to justice senior AQ members it detained 
in 2003, and it has refused to publicly identify these senior members in 
custody. Iran has repeatedly resisted numerous calls to transfer custody of 
AQ detainees to their countries of origin or third counties for interrogation 
or trial. Iran also continued to fail to control the activities of some al-
Qaeda members who fled to Iran following the fall of the Taliban regime 
in Afghanistan.208 
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The United States’ issues with Iran’s support of terrorism stem from Iran’s support of 
anti-Israeli terrorist groups, Iran’s efforts to destabilize Iraq, and Iran’s lack of support in 
the fight against al-Qaeda. 
 While Iran does support anti-Israeli groups and destabilizes Iraq, their support of 
international terror has subsided since the early years after the Iranian Islamic 
Revolution. States often exaggerate claims against regimes considered hostile, and the 
U.S. is no different. What U.S. official documents do not emphasize is that “the United 
States and Iran cooperated in Afghanistan.”209 Nonetheless, Iran has engaged in activities 
counter to U.S. national security interests, especially in regards to Iraq. Paul Pillar 
describes Iran’s participation in terrorism prior to the U.S. 2003 invasion of Iraq as taking 
place in three forms:  
• extraterritorial assassination of Iranian oppositionists;  
• providing money, weapons, and training to groups opposing Israel and the peace 
process, or also to groups against the ruling states in the Middle East North Africa 
region and elsewhere;  
• Iran’s surveillance of U.S. overseas facilities and personnel believed to be 
precursors to possible future terrorist attacks in the event of plummeting 
relations.210  
Critics of Iran point to the vast amounts of rockets Hizbollah employed in its war 
with Israel in the summer of 2006 as evidence that Iran is still supporting terrorism.  
Iran’s support of Hizbollah is less arguable than the legitimacy of Hizbollah itself. The 
international community is not in concurrence on identifying Hizbollah as a terrorist 
organization.  While the United States lists Hizbollah as a terrorist organization, the 
European Union does not.211 Iran’s support of terrorism, outside of the Anti-Israeli 
groups, has subsided in recent years, down from the height of its terrorist activities in the 
1980s. 
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Perhaps the most damaging to U.S. national security interests is Iran’s association 
with al Qaeda, which has been America’s deadliest terrorist foe for the past decade. 
Lawrence Wright describes al Qaeda’s connection with Iran as mainly through Zawahiri, 
who had connections to Iran in the 1980s while the leader of al-Jihad.212 Wright further 
claims that Bin Laden had relations with Iranian-backed Hezbollah and sought their 
training.  Bin Laden was impressed with their success against the U.S. in Lebanon in the 
early 1980s; he wished to learn Hezbollah’s lessons because he wanted the two main 
Islamic sects to work together to destroy the West.213 The 9/11 Commission Report 
states,  
In late 1991 or 1992, discussion in Sudan between al Qaeda and Iranian 
operatives led to an informal agreement to cooperate in providing support  
— even if only training —  for actions carried out primarily against Israel 
and the United States. Not long afterward, senior al Qaeda operatives and 
trainers traveled to Iran to receive training in explosives.214 
 
There were challenges to the al-Qaeda and Iranian connection because Bin Laden did not 
desire to alienate his Saudi supporters by associating with Iran. Nonetheless, numerous 
9/11 attackers traveled through Iran in the two or three years preceding 9/11. However, 
the 9/11 Commission concludes that the attackers were unlikely to know their mission 
during their travels through Iran: “We found no evidence that Iran or Hezbollah was 
aware of the planning for what became the 9/11 attack.”215  
A stronger tie to Iranian direct support of terrorists who attacked U.S. interests is 
the Khobar Towers bombing of June 1996 in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, where 19 
Americans were killed and 312 wounded. “The operation was carried out principally, 
perhaps exclusively, by Saudi Hezbollah, an organization that had received support from 
the government of Iran. While the evidence of Iranian involvement is strong, there are 
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also signs that al Qaeda played some role, as yet unknown.”216 The investigation of the 
Khobar Towers bombing revealed a possible connection between Lebanese Hezbollah 
and Saudi Hezbollah with the support of Iran. 
In June 2001, a U.S. federal grand jury indicted fourteen people in 
connection with the Khobar Towers bombing. Some are in custody and 
others are still at large. According to the U.S. Justice Department, thirteen 
of those indicted are connected to the pro-Iran Saudi Hezbollah terrorist 
group. The fourteenth is linked to Lebanese Hezbollah, also supported by 
Iran. The indictment makes clear, said Attorney General John Ashcroft, 
"that elements of the Iranian government inspired, supported, and 
supervised members of Saudi Hezbollah" as they planned the bombing.217  
Although Iran’s support of terrorism continues, outside of anti-Israeli groups and support 
of anti-American Iraqi militants, the last decade displays a decline in direct terrorist 
attacks against U.S. interests. Iran does have a history of supporting terrorist groups 
against the U.S., Israel and other Iranian adversaries such as Saudi Arabia. Nonetheless, 
Iran does not fully cooperate with the U.S. in the war on terrorism as Iran continues to 
support Hezbollah and is less than fully cooperative against al Qaeda.  
There are a number of reasons experts point to in an effort to understand Iran’s 
associations with terrorism. One reason Iran has historically been thought to support 
terror since its Islamic Revolution is that it seeks to export its revolution. This effort 
strains Iran’s relations with its regional Arab Sunni neighboring regimes opposed to 
Iranian ideology. For Iran—  in the aftermath of their revolution and in the midst of war 
with Iraq — terrorism “was the means whereby Tehran loosened the stranglehold 
imposed by the war with Iraq and the hostility of the Arab and Western states; and it 
served as a dire warning that any initiative taken against Iran would be followed by 
terrorist retaliation.”218 Iran’s support of pro-Palestinian groups originates from a desire 
to export their revolution and to resonate with Arab Muslims against their perceived 
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common enemy, Israel, and to a lesser extent, the United States. As Nikki Keddie notes 
of Iran’s terrorist support, “It regards pro-Palestinian groups like Lebanon’s Hizbollah as 
fighters against Israeli occupation of Palestinian land, who are using the only weapons 
available to nongovernmental groups, not as terrorists.”219 Iran’s support for pro-
Palestinian terrorist groups was also designed “to exert pressure on the West by holding 
its citizens hostage and creating a counterweight to the support given to Iraq by Europe 
and the United States during the eight years of Saddam’s war.”220 Iran’s support of 
terrorism in the Middle East was an extension of diplomacy by other means in an effort 
for power and regional influence. A similar episode is now taking place in Iraq and 
Afghanistan as Iran intervenes to continue instability in both states. 
One of the current issues the United States has with Iran in recent years is its 
intervention in Iraq, which the U.S. claims has created greater instability and led to 
increased deaths of coalition forces. As Vali Nasr states of Iran’s actions in Iraq today, 
Iran’s strategy in this conflict is the same as it was in the 1980s: to focus 
attention on the anti-American and anti-Israeli issues, appropriate popular 
Islamic and Arab slogans, and avoid discussion of sectarian differences. 
This strategy worked for Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Sadrists, inspired 
by Hezbollah, tried to implement it in Iraq as well.221 
 
It is also believed that Iran is supporting various Shiite groups in Iraq to expand its 
influence in the region and to maintain a degree of legitimacy that ties up the United 
States military and reduces Americans’ appetite for conflict, thereby, possibly securing 
the Iranian regime from another U.S. preventative regime change. Iran supports various 
non-government groups in Iraq to thwart the U.S. interests of stabilizing Iraq. 
 The case study of Iran concludes that there are negative effects of the U.S.–Israeli 
relationship in combating terrorism in the Middle East. The U.S. support to Israel 
provides legitimacy and sympathy to all groups who renounce Israel and support its 
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opponents. The Arab–Israeli conflict provides Iran a means to gain support in the region 
from the Arab street. This is true because the plight of the Palestinians resonates with all 
Muslims, whereas Iran would garner little support without the conflict. Groups like al-
Qaeda and states like Iran can garner sympathy and support for their cause by pointing to 
the plight of the Palestinians at the hands of Israeli occupiers, who are supported by the 
U.S.  The U.S.–Israeli relationship negatively affects the U.S. national interest of 
combating terrorism in the Middle East because it brings together Iran, Hezbollah, 
Hamas, and al-Qaeda — all of whom have some competing objectives — together to 
combat Israel and work against U.S. interests in the region. For all the grievances against 
the United States, the one that most resonates throughout the Middle East is the U.S.–
Israeli relationship.  
 While the overall effect of the U.S.–Israeli relationship is assessed as negatively 
affecting its interests of combating terrorism, it does not necessarily follow that if the 
U.S. changed its policy towards greater even-handedness in Middle East relations that 
either Iran or Hezbollah would stop working against U.S. interests. Iran may continue to 
support Hezbollah even if there is an Israeli–Arab peace agreement between Israel and all 
of its neighbors; its support of Hezbollah transcend its hostility towards Israel.  Hezbollah 
would continue to disrupt the pro-U.S. Lebanese government in pursuit of a greater 
political stake. However, an even-handed U.S. policy in the Middle East would further 
reduce the threat of Hezbollah targeting the U.S.  Such a policy would  further de-
legitimize states and groups such as al-Qaeda that exploit Palestinian grievances against 
U.S. interests. 
E.  COMBATING TERRORISM: SYRIA CASE STUDY 
 The case study of Syria and the U.S.–Israeli relationship concludes that the U.S. 
national interest of combating terrorism in the Middle East is negatively affected. Syria is 
accused of not aggressively attempting to quell movement of militants and arms into Iraq, 
and the U.S. claims Syria supports terrorist groups that prolong the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Syria readily admits to supporting anti-Israeli groups in their fight against occupation and 
in defense of territory. Syria initially cooperated with the U.S. against the Taliban and al-
Qaeda by providing valuable intelligence in the aftermath of 9/11. Intelligence support 
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halted with U.S. accusations against Syria for support of anti-Israel groups and for 
fomenting instability in Iraq by weakly securing its borders. Predominately due to Syria’s 
support of anti-Israeli groups who have not attacked U.S. targets in the recent decade, the 
U.S. has lost a valuable ally in the fight against the ideology of al-Qaeda. The case study 
of Syria reveals that the U.S.–Israeli relationship negatively affects the U.S. national 
interest of combating terrorism. 
 Syria remains on the U.S. State Department’s list of countries that sponsor 
international terrorism. Like Iran, direct involvement in terrorist acts by Syria in the past 
two decades has subsided significantly: “Syria has not been implicated directly in an act 
of terrorism since 1986, when Syrian intelligence was reportedly involved in an abortive 
attempt to bomb an El Al airliner in London.”222 More recently, UN preliminary findings 
into the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri indicated that Syrian 
officials may have been involved. The U.S. maintains Syria on the terrorist sponsor list 
for its continued “…political and material support to Hezbollah and political support to 
Palestinian terrorist groups.”223 The European Union does not list Hezbollah on its list of 
terrorist organizations.224 The U.S. also criticizes Syria for failing to stop foreign fighters 
from crossing into Iraq. While Syria is known to provide material logistical support and 
allow political offices in Syria for anti-Israeli groups, Syria is not a major player in 
international terrorism. Paul Pillar states that Syria has developed into a state that 
restrains international terrorism and keeps “its client groups from conducting operations 
aboard and prohibiting them from attacking civilians even in the Levant.”225 Hezbollah 
restraint in attacking civilians ceased during the 2006 conflict with Israel, when both 
sides had civilian casualties.   
According to the U.S. Secretary General, the Israeli bombardments and 
ground invasion into Lebanon killed an estimated 1,200 Lebanese, injured 
over 4,000, killed four U.N. military observers, and created nearly a 
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million internally displaced people. Over 140 Israelis, including 43 
civilians, were killed and over 100 injured, many by Hezbollah attacks 
using rockets.226 
While the targeting of populated areas with imprecise munitions is not condoned, civilian 
casualties from conventional means tend to be seen as less morally heinous than terrorist 
attacks such as suicide bombing attacks against purely civilian targets. While Syria still 
backs anti-Israeli groups, its support of international terrorism has decreased in recent 
decades. In some instances, Syria has been a notable ally in the war on terrorism. 
Syria has provided the U.S. with valuable support against both the Taliban and al-
Qaeda. The State Department reports, “In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the 
Syrian government began limited cooperation with the United States in the global war on 
terrorism.”227 Stephen Zunes states, “Syria has passed on to U.S. officials hundreds of 
files of crucial data regarding al-Qaeda and other radical Islamic groups in the Middle 
East…[And] CIA sources acknowledged that ‘the quality and quantity of information 
from Syria exceeded the agency’s expectation’ but that Syria ‘got little in return for 
it.’”228 The U.S. has acknowledged Syria’s cooperation in discouraging public support 
for al-Qaeda and having provided intelligence that ultimately saved American lives: 
Earlier, on June 18, 2002, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State William Burns 
was quoted as telling a congressional committee that “the cooperation the 
Syrians have provided in their own self-interest on al Qaeda has saved 
American lives.” According to a subsequent news report, Syria helped 
unravel a plot by an al Qaeda group in Canada to attack U.S. and Canadian 
government installations.229 
 
Support from Syria in the war on terrorism has not lasted due to strained relations with 
the U.S.  
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Mark Huband writes that the war on terrorism has “brought together the most 
vehement Middle Eastern enemies of Islamism into the open as potential allies of the 
United States, among them Libya and Syria.”230 While Libya succumbed to Western 
carrots and denounced international terror and rolled back its WMD programs, no carrots 
were made available to Syria whose land, the Golan Heights, has been occupied by Israel 
for forty years in violation of “a series of U.N. Security Council resolutions demanding 
that Israel withdraw from them and cease its colonization drive.”231 While the Arab-
Israeli peace process is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is worth identifying some 
background on both the occupation of the Golan Heights and some negotiations over a 
peace settlement between Israel and Syria. As Donal Neff states, 
Israel on 11 June [1967], one day after the end of fighting, began the 
process of colonizing the Arab territories by razing the Maghrabi Quarter 
of the Old City of Jerusalem. On 15 July Israel quietly established its first 
settlement in occupied territory. It was Kibbutz Merom Hagolan near 
Quneitra on Syria’s Golan Heights.232  
The BBC reported in December 2003 that 31 settlements in the Golan Heights held about 
10,500 inhabitants.233 While Syria has offered peace and recognition for the return of the 
Golan Heights, Israel rejects “land for peace” in the case of the Golan Heights. Syria has 
offered Israel peace, security, concession of the June 4, 1967, border to allow Israel 
passage around the Sea of Galilee, and sovereignty over the water. However, Israel 
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wanted greater concessions of land to the East of the sea. 234 Israel is also skeptical of 
Syria’s sincerity in establishing a lasting peace and forgoing support of Hezbollah after 
an agreement. The negotiations between Syria’s Hafez al-Asad and Israel’s Prime 
Minister Barak, with President Clinton as facilitator, ended without an agreement. These 
negotiations took place during President Clinton’s administrations, and he took the 
favored U.S. position as facilitator: “Clinton, eager to adapt to Barak’s preferences, 
quickly restated that the United States sought only to be a facilitator, helping the parties 
reach agreement, but not seeking to impose its views.”235 Syria is a potential ally to both 
Israel and the U.S., and Syria has shown a propensity to be just that, as it was a “tacit 
ally” of Israel during “Israel’s confrontation with Iraq.”236 It seems as though the U.S. 
has lost a potentially effective ally in Syria against its main threat, al-Qaeda.  
 The United States decided to isolate Syria in the aftermath of 9/11. What is 
arguable is why has the U.S. has chosen to isolate Syria. Some believe Syria’s isolation, 
like the toppling of the Saddam regime, was due to the implementation of the 
neoconservative strategy of promoting democracy through U.S. hegemony and regime 
change.  Others believe such actions in the Middle East were taken to secure Israeli 
                                                 
234 William D. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 
1967, 363. Hafez al-Asad was put off by Israeli Prime Minister Barak’s request for additional land, when 
talks were to be based on former Israeli Prime Minister Rabin’s platform that seemingly prepared to accept 
a similar offer excluding the land around the sea.  PM Rabin was assassinated in 1995 before an agreement 
could take place and President Hafez al-Asad died of a heart attack three months after talks with PM Rabin 
ended. Both occasions were the closest Syria and Israel have come to a peace agreement, while other Israeli 
prime ministers would renounce conceding the Golan Heights. The political climate in Israel hampered 
both Rabin and Barak from finalizing agreements as many Israelis were still not prepared to concede the 
Golan Heights and the Israeli Labor Party of Rabin and Barak did not enjoy commanding mandates. 
235 William D. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 
1967, 360. 
236 Ibid., 331. This passage seemingly refers to Israel’s strike on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor and 
Syria’s siding with Iran during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s that kept Israel’s most formidable threat 
militarily engaged to its East and heavily weakened as a result of the near decade long conflict. 
 77
objectives.237 While the conclusion of such a debate is outside the scope of this thesis, 
noting the debate is valuable because it brings to light the fact that there are prominent 
policymakers, politicians, intellectuals, and government officials who believe that such 
policies are due to a desire to further Israel’s perceived agenda in the region. It is these 
perceptions of the U.S.–Israeli relationship that further anti-Americanism in the Middle 
East, which is then exploited by Iran, Syria, and terrorist groups like al-Qaeda, to foment 
further anti-Americanism, gain sympathizers, and increase the pool of recruits for 
operations against U.S. and Israeli interests.   
The U.S.–Israeli relationship negatively affects the U.S. national interest of 
combating terrorism in the Middle East because the U.S. has lost Syria, a valuable ally 
against the al-Qaeda threat. While U.S. policy to isolate Syria may be in the interest of 
Israel, it is also in the U.S. interest of providing the pro-U.S. Lebanese government 
greater autonomy from Syrian influence. The isolation may ultimately lead to Syria’s 
capitulation on its support of anti-Israeli and anti-Lebanese government groups, which 
would further both Israeli and U.S. interests. The isolation of Syria may positively affect 
Israel and the pro-U.S. Lebanese governments in the long run. However, in the short-
term, the isolation of Syria negatively affects the U.S. fight against al-Qaeda. This is true 
because Syria has ended its fruitful intelligence-sharing with the U.S. Regardless of the 
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rationale for Syria’s isolation, the perceived U.S.–Israeli relationship will be exploited by 
U.S. enemies; anti-American states and groups will use Syria’s isolation as evidence of 
U.S. favoring Israel, which may ultimately provide greater support of anti-U.S. groups 
such as al-Qaeda and states like Syria.  
F.  COMBATING TERRORISM: EGYPTIAN CASE STUDY 
 The case study of Egypt reveals that the U.S.–Israeli relationship has a somewhat 
negative effect on the U.S. interest of combating terrorism in the case of Egypt. Egypt is 
seen as a close ally with the United States in the war the war on terrorism; however, there 
is anti-Americanism and sympathy for al-Qaeda amongst the Egyptian populace. The 
Egyptian government has remained steadfast against Islamic militants and its support in 
the war on terrorism. Egypt is neither designated a state sponsor of terror, nor deemed as 
“not fully cooperating” in combating terrorism.238  
 While the U.S. enjoys the support of the Egyptian government, Egyptians are 
much less enthusiastic about American foreign policy and have openly displayed such 
displeasure. As Arthur Goldschmidt Jr. stated, many Muslims in Egypt and elsewhere, 
“applauded when Egyptian and Saudi terrorists hijacked American passenger jets on 11 
September 2001 and flew them into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Egypt’s 
government was appalled, but the reaction of the Arab street was that the United States 
deserved what it got.”239 Polls indicate that in Egypt, only 15 percent of the population 
views the United States favorably.240 It is the resentment of the United States as a result 
of U.S. policy, along with other factors, that enables terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda to 
obtain support and recruits to its cause. The United States is not supported in the war on 
terrorism by the Egyptian populace, and the negative relationship adversely affects our 
efforts in combating terrorism. 
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 While the Egyptian populace has shown disdain for the United States, the 
Egyptian regime has been steadfast with its support against international terrorism. The 
U.S. has been paying for Egypt’s support ever since the U.S. brokered Israeli–Egyptian 
peace accords in 1979. Despite Egypt maintaining only a “cold peace” with Israel and its 
lack of political reform, the U.S. has maintained a robust assistance package to Egypt for 
decades. “The United States has provided Egypt with an annual average of over $2 
billion in economic and military foreign assistance since 1979.”241 The Egyptian regime 
has had its own Islamist militant issues in the past and has no reason to support violent 
Islamist militants now.  
 The Egyptian government supports both U.S. efforts against terrorism and U.S. 
efforts in Iraq. The Egyptian government has had success in dealing with Islamic terror in 
Egypt. Egypt and the United States have a shared concern regarding terrorism, and 
“Egypt can claim some experience with the subject, having defeated domestic Islamist 
terrorists intent on overthrowing the government.”242 International terrorists will not find 
a refuge in Egypt because “The Egyptian government’s well-known opposition to 
Islamist terrorism and its effective intelligence and security services have made it less 
likely that terror groups will seek safe haven there.”243 The report further states that “the 
Egyptian regime provided evidence for counterterrorism cases in the United States.”244 
There is some belief that Egypt’s close support of the U.S. during the war on terrorism is 
also due to the U.S. support against Egyptian Islamists in the late 1990s. Steve Coll 
states, 
The CIA worked closely during 1997 with Egyptian intelligence and 
security services in a large-scale, multinational campaign to break the 
back of its violent Islamist movement. CIA officers seized a number of 
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Egyptian fugitives in foreign countries such as Azerbaijan and Albania 
and secretly shipped them to Cairo for trial.245  
The Egyptian regime fully supports the United States in the war on terrorism regardless 
of U.S. support of Israel. 
 The case study of Egypt and the U.S.–Israeli relationship reveals that the U.S. 
interest of combating terrorism somewhat negatively affects the U.S. interest in 
combating terrorism in the Middle East. The negative relationship is not due to the 
Egyptian regime but due to the Egyptian populace, who dislikes U.S. foreign policy in 
the Middle East and provides recruits for international terrorist groups like al-Qaeda. The 
9/11 attacks depict how Egyptians can be recruited into international Islamic terrorist 
groups and attack the U.S. as a handful of the 9/11 hijackers were Egyptian. While the 
government supports the U.S. in the war on terrorism, the populace is anti-American and 
susceptible to recruitment in terrorist organizations for a multitude of reasons, with U.S. 
foreign policy in the Middle East and U.S.–Israeli interests figuring prominently in the 
list of grievances against the United States.  
G.  COMBATING TERRORISM CONCLUSION 
 The chapter on terrorism concludes that the U.S. interest of combating terrorism 
in the Middle East is negatively affected by the U.S.–Israeli relationship. The case studies 
of Iran and Syria both conclude that the U.S.–Israeli relationship negatively affects the 
U.S. national interest of combating terrorism. The case study of Egypt concluded that 
while the Egyptian government fully supports the war on terrorism, its population’s anti-
Americanism is greater due to the U.S. actions in response to 9/11.  
 The case study of combating terrorism indicates that there are several causes that 
lead to the conclusion that the U.S. national interest is negatively affected by the U.S.–
Israeli relationship. The U.S. objective to defeat terrorism overall, vice focusing on the 
al-Qaeda threat, has hampered efforts to defeat the main terrorist threat to the U.S., al-
Qaeda. Both Iran and Syria exploit the Arab-Israeli conflict to pursue their interests in the 
region that transcend the Palestinian cause. Iran desires to spread its Islamic Revolution, 
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become a regional power, and to hamper U.S. objectives in the Middle East. While Iran 
may garner support for its defiance of the West and support to anti-Israeli groups, it does 
not follow that Iran would halt its support of such groups if the U.S. emphasized an even-
handed approach to Arab-Israeli issues. The case study of Syria concluded that the U.S.–
Israeli relationship negatively affects the U.S. national interest of combating terrorism 
because the perceived relationship provides the Syrian government with support against 
U.S. objectives in the Middle East. Again, in the case of Syria, it is not clear whether 
Syria would halt its support of anti-Israeli groups, especially its proxies in Lebanon, for 
Syria has an interest in maintaining a strong influence in Lebanon that will prevail  — 
even after a Syrian–Israeli peace agreement. The Syrian case study also noted the 
potential strength in a partner such as Syria in the fight against al-Qaeda; before isolation, 
intelligence ties prevented terror. The case study of Syria further concluded that there is a 
debate over whether U.S. isolation of Syria stems from U.S. support of Israel or 
implementation of the neoconservative agenda. Nonetheless, the chapter concludes that 
the U.S.–Israeli relationship hampers the war on terrorism due to the exploitation of the 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis indicates that there are some negative consequences resulting from the 
U.S.–Israeli relationship on other U.S. national interests in the Middle East. Each of the 
three U.S. national interests studied in this chapter concluded that the U.S.–Israeli 
relationship to some degree negatively affected U.S. interests of nonproliferation, 
spreading democracy, and combating terrorism.   
While the methodology of this thesis has value in assessing the effect of the U.S.–
Israeli relationship on other U.S. interests in the Middle East, it can only provide some 
insight on the effect of the U.S.–Israeli relationship and cautions against any overall 
conclusions. The future of U.S. national security and stability in the Middle East may 
depend on how the U.S. balances the interests of its relationship with Israel, proliferation, 
spreading democracy, and combating terrorism that are discussed in this thesis along with 
other U.S. national interests in the region such as regional stability and stable oil markets.  
The U.S. has an important interest in its long-time ally, Israel, and will continue to 
conduct relations in the region in a manner conducive with Israel’s security. Nonetheless, 
this thesis points to a couple of national security concerns that are present in today’s 
environment. 
 Many argue that the greatest concern for U.S. national security officials is the 
threat that terrorists with an al Qaeda-type ideology may become armed with a WMD 
capability and could then wreak havoc on the U.S. and its Western allies. An additional 
concern in the region is how the actors in the region (Israel, U.S., Arab regimes, West, 
U.N.) will respond to nuclear proliferation, especially in light of both U.S. and Israeli 
policy regarding the Iran’s potential nuclear capability. The U.S. has defined Arab-Israeli 
peace as an objective, yet the extent of the benefits of such a peace on the U.S. achieving 
its other Middle East objectives is arguable. And even the extent of reduced anti-
Americanism in the Middle East after a peace settlement is unknown. Nonetheless, many 
scholars and policy makers do argue that an Arab-Israeli peace would significantly 
enhance the prospects of the U.S. achieving its national objectives in the Middle East. 
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However, such a debate is beyond the scope of this thesis, for this thesis merely calls for 
greater debate on the U.S.–Israeli relationship on other U.S. national interests in the 
Middle East. 
While this thesis has concluded that the U.S.–Israeli relationship and Israel’s de 
factor nuclear program are not the main impetus to proliferation in the Middle East, there 
are charges of hypocrisy that challenge U.S. legitimacy in confronting nuclear 
proliferators. The main proliferation threat in the Middle East is Iran. Iran’s desire for 
nuclear weapons lies in its desire for greater regional influence and in an attempt to 
provide a deterrent for its perceived main threat, the United States. The measured 
responses of the U.S., the international community, and Israel will need to be coordinated 
to ensure the least amount of disruption in the region, while simultaneously addressing 
legitimate state security requirements. Another concern for proliferation in the Middle 
East is Egypt. “During the ruling National Democratic Party’s annual conference in 
September 2006, President Mubarak and his son Gamal announced in separate speeches 
Egypt’s plans to revive its long dormant nuclear energy program.”246 While Egypt is a 
member of the NPT, which allows member to pursue nuclear energy for peaceful means, 
“Egypt admitted to failing to disclose the full extent of its nuclear research activities to 
the IAEA.”247 The international non-proliferation regime has yet to be successful in 
preventing a state having the necessary materials, expertise, and intent from developing 
nuclear weapons. While this thesis may highlight some pending international security 
concerns regarding Iran’s current pursuit of nuclear weapons and the potential for Egypt 
to also pursue a nuclear program, it has concluded that the U.S.–Israeli relationship is not 
the main reason for the potential proliferation. However, the U.S. and Israel are likely to 
be the main responders to such proliferation.  
The case study of democracy concluded that, of the three states studied, only in 
Syria does the U.S.–Israeli relationship negatively affect the prospect for democracy. The 
cases of Iran and Egypt showed the effect of the U.S.–Israeli relationship on spreading 
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democracy to be negligible. The primary motivator for all three regimes is to remain in 
power and each regime rejects and prevents any political reform that would impede the 
incumbent’s hold on power. Each regime maintains the political structure and necessary 
security forces to ensure the status quo. The case study of Syria concluded that the U.S.–
Israeli relationship negatively affected prospects for reform due to regime opposition 
groups’ inability to garner support from the U.S.  The majority of Syrians dislike U.S. 
policies in the Middle East, especially U.S. perceived favoritism of Israel. Opposition 
groups in Syria are unable to seek U.S. support in challenging the al-Asad regime for 
they would lose credibility with the Syrian people. Effective political control coupled 
with robust security apparatuses designed to thwart political opposition, prevents 
opposition forces from becoming credible threats to the regime. Syrians relative universal 
support of the al-Asad regime in foreign relations is the limiting factor for the U.S.’s 
ability to effect political reform in Syria. The U.S.–Israeli relationship and corresponding 
U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East leads to anti-Americanism in Syria, which has the 
consequences of weakening political groups opposing the al-Asad regime and thus 
enabling the continuance of authoritarianism in Syria. The Syrian population’s support of 
al-Asad’s foreign policy implies that even democracy in Syria may not lead to Syria’s 
renunciation of Hezbollah and other anti-Israel groups or a hands-off policy with 
Lebanon.  
The chapter on terrorism concluded that the U.S.–Israeli relationship negatively 
affects the U.S. national interest of combating terrorism in the Middle East, specifically 
against al Qaeda. The chapter stated that the U.S. broad objectives in combating terrorism 
hamper the fight against its main terrorist threat, al Qaeda. The arguably less effective 
strategy of encompassing all Islamic militants into one category negatively affects the 
support of the Middle East region in the fight against terrorism. Anti-Israeli groups such 
as Hezbollah and Hamas, while their tactics are often called into question, their 
objectives have wide support throughout the region. By encompassing all Islamic militant 
groups together as the enemy in the war on terrorism, the U.S. has lost the support of a 
valuable ally against al Qaeda, Syria. The secular Syrian regime is a natural ally against 
international Islamic groups with al-Qaeda like ideologies. The chapter on terrorism did 
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make clear that even if Syria allied with the U.S. against al Qaeda, there is little reason to 
believe that it would halt its support of Hezbollah even in the instance of an Arab-Israeli 
peace. Syria has historical roots in Lebanon and one objective of Syria is to maintain 
influence with its unstable neighbor. Syrian influence in Lebanon negatively affects 
another U.S. interest, safeguarding Lebanon’s Pro-West democracy. Similarly, Iran too 
would not likely halt support of Hezbollah in the event the U.S. pursues a greater 
perceived even-handedness in Middle Eastern affairs for Iran will still desire influence in 
Lebanon and the region. Iran will continue to work against U.S. interests in the region 
with the intent to secure itself from its perceived threat that the U.S. may militarily seek 
regime change in Iran. Anti-Americanism in the Middle East is exacerbated by the U.S.–
Israeli relationship and U.S. foreign policies combating terrorism after 9/11. 
While the U.S.–Israeli relationship is known to increase anti-Americanism, the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is also a known motivator for anti-Israeli terrorism. The U.S. 
Country Reports on Terrorism states, “The Israeli/Palestinian conflict remains a source of 
terrorist motivation.”248 The chapter provided evidence that groups like Hamas and 
Hezbollah can moderate. As Ayoob argues, “The end of occupation, if and when it comes 
about, will fundamentally change this action-reaction dynamic [cycle of violence with 
Israel]. Hamas, like Hezbollah, will be forced to turn itself principally into a political 
party…”249 Some U.S. officials are understandably anathema to believe such groups can 
moderate and even to consider peace with them for the memory of Hezbollah attacks 
against the U.S. remain vivid, for prior to the onset of al Qaeda, Hezbollah was the 
terrorist group identified as responsible for the most American deaths. However, states do 
make peace after horrific violence such as U.S. peace with Japan, and, U.S. military ships 
have even made port-calls in Vietnam. Despite groups like Hezbollah and Hamas being 
non-state actors, the U.S. can negotiate with such groups in an effort to resolve the Arab-
Israeli conflict. The U.S. would be sure to emphasize the recognition and security of its 
ally, Israel, as its primary objective in any peace talks. While anti-Americanism in the 
Middle East stems from more than just perceived U.S. one-sidedness towards Israel, as 
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Brezezinski, while citing numerous polls, states of Arab grievances that stem anti-
Americanism, “the most evident is the Arab resentment of U.S. support for Israel.”250 As 
most Palestinians favor a settlement with Israel, resolution of the Israeli Palestinian 
conflict will further de-legitimize terrorist tactics against Israel and reduce anti-
Americanism in the Middle East. Less anti-Americanism is liable to reduce sympathy for 
and support of al Qaeda.  
This thesis does not question whether the U.S. should maintain support of Israel. 
The U.S. had an interest in maintaining steadfast relations with its allies. There is value in 
encouraging and supporting states with similar democratic values. The normative premise 
for such relations cannot be disregarded even if a more robust assessment of U.S. national 
security interests in the Middle East should conclude that there are greater consequences 
to U.S. national security as a result of the U.S.–Israeli relationship. While outside the 
scope of this thesis, the U.S. has interests in maintaining relations with friendly 
governments to display the resolve and permanency of such relations. The U.S. would 
likely have trouble finding everlasting allies should it be inconsistent with its support of 
its own allies. 
While proliferation of WMD is of great concern, the combined threat of WMD in 
the hands of terrorists like al Qaeda poses arguably the gravest threat to U.S. national 
security. Bin Laden reportedly displayed the desire and intent to obtain weapons-grade 
uranium from Sudanese contacts in an effort to seek the capability to achieve mass 
casualties of the greatest proportions.251 Such a concern highlights the complexity of U.S. 
foreign policy in the Middle East and suggests that the U.S. may be hesitant to implement 
policies that may align Iran with al Qaeda, thus marrying-up two of its greatest threats.  
Such scenarios further highlight the limitations of this thesis.  
While this thesis identified some negative consequences of the U.S.–Israeli 
relationship on other specific interests (proliferation, spreading democracy, and 
combating terrorism) relative to the individual state case studies conducted, this 
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simplified approach has recognized limited value for addressing U.S. national interests in 
the Middle East.  This thesis chose to neglect important regional interests such as 
regional stability and stable oil markets. What this thesis does accomplish is that it 
identifies that there may be negative consequences for the U.S. due to its support of 
Israel. This points to a need for greater discussion on the empirical consequences of the 
relationship on other U.S. national security interests in the Middle East to ensure U.S. 
foreign policies best protect U.S. national security. While the United States will always 
be closely allied with Israel and will keep Israel’s security as an important interest, the 
effects of the relationship should not only be debated in the U.S., but the debate should be 
encouraged, frequent, and cordial.        
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